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Despite their joint relevance to democracy, no article to date has
attempted to analyze election law alongside education law. This Article
examines the relationship between the doctrinal threads of these bodies
of law. From this study, this Article concludes that, while election law is
imbued with democratic principles to guide courts and policymakers-
such as the one-person one-vote principle-education law is not guided
by any such democratic principles. Additionally, while electoral
boundaries are viewed as malleable under federal law, school district
boundaries are not. In light of these doctrinal differences, and in light of
the :importance of education to democracy, this Article advocates a
policy of democratic school desegregation based on a principle focused
on reducing socioeconomic isolation in schools. This democratic
principle, referred to in this Article as the 60/40 principle, has the
ultimate goal of ensuring that no child in the United States attends a
school with a low-income student majority. Under this principle, school
district boundaries are not sacrosanct and may be adjusted as a last resort
to achieve the ideals of democratic school desegregation.
* Associate, Williams & Connolly LLP; Yale Law School, J.D. 2011; Dominican
University, M.A.T. 2008; Massachusetts Institute of Technology, S.B. 2006. The
statements and opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not
necessarily reflect he views of, and should not be attributed to, Williams & Connolly
LLP or its clients. Many thanks to Richard Kahlenberg and Phil Tegeler for their helpful
comments and feedback on this Article, to the staff of the Penn State Law Review, and to
my wife for her unconditional support.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most basic needs of any democratic nation is a well-
informed citizenry that is prepared to participate and vote in elections.
This ideal has not been met in the United States, where a substantial
proportion of the population-particularly the socioeconomically
disadvantaged-is undereducated and therefore ill-prepared to engage
effectively in the electoral process.1 Moreover, educational deficiencies
contribute to low voter turnout in the United States, and voter
participation would improve if these deficiencies were addressed.2
The problem certainly is not that people do not recognize the
democratic ideals that flow from an educated society. John Dewey
recognized the basic principle in his seminal work Democracy and
Education almost 100 years ago, where he explained that "a government
resting upon popular suffrage cannot be successful unless those who
elect and who obey their governors are educated.,3 According to Dewey,
a society that purports to be a land of opportunity-that is, a place that
fosters upward mobility and equality of opportunity---"must see to it that
its members are educated to personal initiative and adaptability."4 And,
as Amy Gutmann explained over 25 years ago,
1. The rural United States population is also known to receive a subpar education
in many circumstances. Though this Article primarily discusses urban educational
settings, the democratic school desegregation proposal advanced here could apply to rural
settings as well, depending on the income distribution of students in those settings.
2. See, e.g., Kevin Milligan, Enrico Moretti & Philip Oreopoulos, Does Education
Improve Citizenship: Evidence from the U.S. and U.K. 21 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 9584, 2003) (finding that "education improves
participation not only as measured by voter turnout, but also in broader measures").
3. JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 101 (1916). See, e.g., NEL
NODDINGS, EDUCATION & DEMOCRACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 22 (2013) (noting the
importance of education in "guiding [students] toward deliberative thinking and
communication"); EDUCATION, JUSTICE, AND DEMOCRACY 14 (Danielle Allen & Rob
Reich eds., 2013) (noting the importance of "a commitment to the view that, if adults are
to succeed in educating their children to steer democracy effectively when it is their turn,
those adults must constantly work to educate themselves so they might become better
educators").
4. DEWEY, supra note 3, at 102.
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The democratic truth in equalization is that all children should learn
enough to be able not just to live a minimally decent life, but also to
participate effectively in the democratic processes by which
individual choices are socially structured. A democratic state,
therefore, must ake steps to avoid those inequalities that deprive
children of educational attainment adequate to participate in the
political processes. 5
Numerous other scholars have recognized the connections between
democracy and education.6
Nonetheless, when people think of "democracy," they typically
think about free and fair elections before thinking about education. Thus
it is unsurprising that our Supreme Court has consistently, over the past
50-plus years, recognized voting as a fundamental right protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.7 In contrast, as the
Supreme Court made clear in San Antonio v. Rodriguez,8 education has
never been accorded "fundamental right" status. Even so, Rodriguez
recognized the importance of education in promoting democracy,
explaining that "'[c]ompulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society."'9 Other Supreme
Court cases have also recognized the inevitable link between democracy
and education. 10
Though our law acknowledges the important role education plays in
our democracy, it does little to ameliorate the antidemocratic ends that
existing school district boundaries promote; in many cases, these
boundaries are roadblocks to promoting racial and socioeconomic
integration between and among schools. Although the lines separating
5. Amy GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 134 (1987).
6. See Aaron J. Saiger, The School District Boundary Problem, 42 URB. LAW. 495,
521-23 (2010).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
8. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
9. Id. at 29-30 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ. 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954)).
10. See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979) (recognizing the link
between democracy and education, citing John Dewey, and explaining that "[tihe
importance of public schools in the preparation of individuals for participation as
citizens, and in the preservation of the values on which our society rests, long has been
recognized by our decisions"); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter wrote:
The process of education has naturally enough been the basis of hope for the
perdurance of our democracy on the part of all our great leaders, from Thomas
Jefferson onwards. To regard teachers -- in our entire educational system, from
the primary grades to the university -- as the priests of our democracy is
therefore not to indulge in hyperbole.
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electoral districts are viewed as malleable-particularly in the wake of
the Supreme Court's establishment of the one-person one-vote principle
in Reynolds v. Sims1 and the principles established by the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 12-the lines separating school districts have been viewed as
far more sacrosanct. Indeed, as a result of reapportionment and the one-
person one-vote principle, electoral district lines at both the federal and
state levels are redrawn once every ten years.3 These changes to
electoral maps are subject to judicial scrutiny pursuant to § 2 of the
Voting Rights Act 14 and the equal protection principles of the
Constitution.5
This Article argues that, given the importance of education to
democracy, school district boundaries should not be viewed as
sacrosanct, nor should they be treated as such, under our law.
Accordingly, this Article proposes a solution to the segregation problem
whereby, via a duly passed federal law (or corresponding state laws),
states and school districts, guided by a democratic equalization principle,
may revisit school district boundaries as necessary.'6  This principle,
which this Article refers to as the 60/40 principle, 7 is a democratic
11. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (establishing the one-person one-vote
principle).
12. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973aa-6 (2012).
13. See 2 U.S.C. § 2a(a) (2012) (reapportioning the number of representatives
allotted to each state pursuant to each decennial census); id. § 2c (requiring that the
number of electoral districts equal the number of representatives allotted to each state).
Although federal law does not expressly compel states to redistrict on or before a certain
date, nearly every state in the union requires that it redistrict within a certain time frame
after each decennial census. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
REDISTRICTING LAW 2010, at 155-60 (2009) (illustrating that 40 states set a deadline for
redistricting, which typically occurs prior to the election following the census). Even
though some of the states do not formally set a deadline with their own laws, those states
still redistrict in practice. See State Legislative and Congressional Redistricting After the
2010 Census, BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/StateLegislative-and CongressionalRedistrictingafter the_201
0_Census (last visited March 29, 2015) (indicating that Arizona, California, Georgia,
Michigan, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, and West Virginia have engaged in redistricting efforts after the 2010 census).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1973.
15. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (invalidating the
coverage formula of § 4 of the Voting Rights Act, rendering the preclearance requirement
of § 5 hollow).
16. For example, school district boundaries could be altered every ten years, after
each decennial census. See Saiger, supra note 6, at 531-48 (presenting the theoretical
outlines of a similar proposal).
17. Under this principle, every school district must, at minimum, distribute its
students such that fewer than 60% of the students in each of its schools comprise low-
income students. Each school district should further provide incentives such that, over
time, fewer than 40% of the students in each of its schools comprise low-income
students. One proxy for "low-income" students is free and reduced price lunch.
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equalization principle which seeks to minimize the socioeconomic
isolation of public school students-whether rich or poor. Such a
principle could be advanced by the federal government at-large, through,
for example, an incentive program like Race To The Top ("RTTT") or
the next reauthorization of No Child Left Behind ("NCLB"), or by
individual state-law initiative.
Assuming that such a democratic equalization principle were
adopted, numerous democratic advantages would follow. First, under
such a regime, lawmakers could consider a wide array of solutions to the
socioeconomic isolation problem, including both intra- and inter- district
solutions that would not require redrawing of school district
boundaries.8 Eventually, if these initial solutions do not reasonably
ensure progress toward the goals of the principle, lawmakers could
eventually consider measures that would alter existing school district
boundaries. Such redistricting efforts would transform school district
boundaries into tools that could be used to promote de jure integration-
rather than entrench them and promote de facto segregation. Periodically
redrawing school district boundaries will provide legal benefits because
such a regime would more appropriately align existing Supreme Court
jurisprudence-such as that articulated in Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education'9 and Milliken v. Bradley°-with the
ideals of democratic school desegregation. Moreover, insofar as
lawmakers and legal scholars analyze education as a democratic
"good,",21 they can apply principles of antitrust and competition law to
analyze the degree to which school district boundaries promote a
procompetitive or anticompetitive "market" for accessing quality
education.22
18. Examples of such methods that have proven somewhat effective include
interdistrict magnet school programs and interdistrict transfer programs. See Ann Mantil,
Anne G. Perkins & Stephanie Aberger, The Challenge of High-Poverty Schools: How
Feasible Is Socioeconomic School Integration?, in THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL INTEGRATION
155, 191-93 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2012). Other methods are also discussed in
more detail below.
19. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
20. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
21. See, e.g., Maxine Eichner, Who Should Control Children's Education? Parents,
Children, and the State, 75 U. CIN. L. REv. 1339, 1369 (2007) ("But we are not only a
liberal polity; we are also a democracy. The claim to legitimacy of collective self-rule
therefore provides an alternative source of justification through which the issue of civic
education must be analyzed.").
22. Although beyond the scope of this Article, a literature of political antitrust has
emerged that seeks to analyze the law of democracy and the provision of democratic
goods under an antitrust framework. For a summary of this literature, see generally Yen-
Tu Su, Retracing Political Antitrust: A Genealogy and Its Lessons, 27 J.L. & POL. 1
(2011).
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Additional benefits will also accrue from the proposal advanced in
this Article. First, revisiting school district boundaries every decade or
so can, over time, erode the prevailing cultural view that school district
boundaries must remain static over time, making the national
consciousness more receptive to such changes. For example, because
students and parents will expect that school district boundaries can and
may change at relatively frequent intervals, these individuals are more
likely to be invested in the success of school districts at-large--rather
than simply the local school district in which they currently live.
Individuals, for example, may need to confront the possibility that they
could be "redistricted" into a neighboring district. This would maintain
the ideal of local control in the sense that everyone will retain a "home"
school district but, at the same time, create enough uncertainty such that
local control will not come at the complete neglect of the interests of
adjoining school districts or a larger metropolitan area. And, to the
extent that individuals do not become receptive to school district
boundary changes, the 60/40 principle will provide incentives to achieve
socioeconomic diversity in schools without redrawing those boundaries,
as noted above.
The 60/40 principle builds on existing school desegregation law and
policy literature. First, this is the only Article in the law-review literature
that has comprehensively contextualized the challenges education law
faces by undertaking a parallel examination of election law. Second, this
Article's democratic school desegregation policy proposal supplements
the existing policy literature. Policy proposals in the desegregation
literature either have suggested consolidating entire metropolitan areas
into larger school districts23 or, more recently, have offered remedies
involving voluntary desegregation plans that include, among other
things, regional magnet schools and inter-district transfers between urban
and suburban districts.24 While some have suggested general policies of
23. See, e.g., Gary Orfield, Metropolitan School Desegregation: Impacts on
Metropolitan Society, 80 MINN. L. REV. 825, 844-45 (1996) ("[A] metropolitan
desegregation plan is very likely to put all students in majority white schools or, perhaps,
evenly balanced magnet schools.").
24. See, e.g., AMY STUART WELLS ET AL., CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON INST. FOR
RACE & JUSTICE, BOUNDARY CROSSING FOR DIVERSITY, EQUITY AND ACHIEVEMENT 3
(2009), available at http://www.charleshamiltonhouston.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/WellsBoundaryCrossing.pdf; Elizabeth DeBray-Pelot & Erica
Frankenberg, Federal Legislation To Promote Metropolitan Approaches to Educational
and Housing Opportunity, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 265, 271 (2010); Daniel
Kiel, The Enduring Power of Milliken's Fences, 45 URB. LAW. 137, 176 (2013); Philip
Tegeler, The "Compelling Government Interest" in School Diversity: Rebuilding the
Case for an Affirmative Government Role, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1021, 1045 (2014);
Erika K. Wilson, Toward a Theory of Equitable Federated Regionalism in Public
Education, 61 UCLAL. REV. 1416, 1465-67 (2014).
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altering school district boundaries to foster integration,25 only one
article's proposal to date has suggested redrawing school district
boundaries periodically according to a democratic principle.26 However,
the democratic equalization principle adopted in that article is quite
different from the one proposed here and, while theoretically
provocative, would likely be less practical than the proposal advanced in
this Article.27 Additionally, whereas the proposal of that article seems to
contemplate perpetual redistricting, this Article emphasizes the primacy
of the democratic equalization principle, views redistricting as a last
resort, and seeks a steady state wherein legally-compelled redistricting is
or would no longer be necessary.
This Article will proceed in five parts. Part I will explain existing
principles of election law, including the Supreme Court's fundamental
rights jurisprudence and the legislative and judicial principles that
compel both federal and state electoral districts to be redrawn after each
decennial census. Next, Part II will explain how-despite the apparent
similarities between voting and education as democracy-promoting
tools-Supreme Court jurisprudence in the education arena diverges
dramatically from election-law jurisprudence. This divergence exists
25. See, e.g., Margaret C. Hobday, Geneva Finn & Myron Orfield, A Missed
Opportunity: Minnesota's Failed Experiment with Choice-Based Integration, 35 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv 936, 975 (2009) ("Integrated schools are possible, even after Parents
Involved, if states adjust school district attendance boundaries to maximize integrated
school attendance zones."); see also Taryn Williams, Note, Outside the Lines: The Case
for Socioeconomic Integration in Urban School Districts, 2010 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 435,
461-64 (proposing redrawing school districts to be "flower-petal" districts that emanate
from the center of a city to capture socioeconomic diversity or, in the alternative,
statewide district consolidation).
26. See Saiger, supra note 6, at 496-97.
27. The principle Saiger adopts seeks to maximize within-district variances in
wealth. See Aaron J. Saiger, Local Government without Tiebout, 41 URB. LAW. 93, 128
(2009) ("The analogue of one-person-one-vote is therefore to draw local boundary lines
so as to maximize mean within-district variance in individual wealth .... Like one-
person-one-vote, a variance-in-wealth-maximizing rule incorporates not a substantive
definition of equality but a prophylaxis against structural political failure."); see also
Saiger, supra note 6, at 541. This principle would ensure that the widest possible ranges
of income reside within each school district. While this principle makes sense
theoretically, it would likely be difficult to implement because it lacks a clear baseline
from which he seeks to maximize variance. For example, does Saiger assume that the
number of school districts remains constant or that it could change? If he assumes it
could change, the theoretical maximum variance would always be obtained by creating
an at-large school district comprising the entire state. He also acknowledges, but does
not address, the problems associated with intra-district segregation, suggesting that the
problems would be solved organically in a diverse school district. See id. at 538 ("A
diverse polity, all things equal, is better situated to resist sub-district sorting than a
homogeneous one, where sorting is preordained."). My proposal would explicitly require
efforts to reduce intra-district segregation through its goal of ensuring that all schools are
less than 50% low-income.
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both in terms of the nature of the right and the law's treatment of
electoral and school district boundaries. Part III will then reflect on the
lessons that can be drawn from the examination in Parts I and II and will
consider the implications of these lessons on a prospective principle for
"democratic school desegregation." Part IV will outline the contours of
the proposal, guided by the 60/40 principle, that would promote
desegregation by facilitating periodic redrawing of school district
boundaries on an as-needed basis, and will explain how such a law could
be passed and implemented at either the state or federal level. Finally,
Part V will list the advantages of such a proposal while also recognizing
some of the challenges that could arise in implementing it, particularly at
this preliminary stage.
I. A PRIMER ON ExISTING ELECTION LAW AND THE MALLEABLE
NATURE OF ELECTORAL DISTRICT BOUNDARIES
This Part briefly explains the election-law backdrop that has set the
stage for modem electoral redistricting in the United States. It explains
that, until the middle of the twentieth century, there were few legal
constraints on electoral districting and courts had been hesitant o enter
the political thicket of adjudicating disputes over electoral boundaries.
However, as time wore on, both Congress and the courts established
democratic electoral principles that guide policymakers to this day.
A. The Early Years: A Complete Lack of a Democratic
Equalization Principle
It is often assumed that single-member electoral districts of equal
population were always the norm in the United States. But that is not
correct: prior to 1842, Congress had not even mandated the use of
single-member districts in congressional elections, and many states used
multi-member districts or conducted at-large elections for their
representatives.28 The Reapportionment Act of 1842 compelled states to
create single-member districts-that is, "districts composed of
contiguous territory equal in number to the number of Representatives to
which said [s]tate may be entitled"29 -but Congress did not require these
28. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW
OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 1191 (3d ed. 2007).
Issacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes explain:
Frequently, it is assumed that the United States has always used single-member
districts to elect members of Congress .... But this is inaccurate. Only after a
lengthy struggle did Congress eventually come in 1842 to use its powers under
Art. I, § 4 of the Constitution to legislate and require single-member districts.
See id.
29. See id at 1192-93; see also Act of June 25, 1842, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491.
2015]
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districts to have equal populations. In 1872, Congress added a
requirement of substantial equality of inhabitants, which it reinforced in
1911.3o The 1911 act required the single-member districts to be
"compact" in addition to contiguous and equally populated,3" but that
requirement, along with all requirements pertaining to single-member
districts, lapsed with the passage of the Reapportionment Act of 1929.32
States thus had both single- and multi-member districts from 1929 to
1967 when Congress enacted legislation that reinstituted the single-
member district requirement once and for all.33
Given this backdrop, courts were hesitant to intervene in electoral
redistricting, let alone require equally-populated districts. For example,
in the Supreme Court's 1946 decision in Colegrove v. Green,
34
petitioners sought review of an electoral districting scheme wherein
certain Illinois congressional districts had populations that were far
larger than those in other districts.35  Indeed, the "Illinois legislature
ha[d] failed to revise its congressional Representative districts in order to
reflect great changes, during more than a generation, in the distribution
of its population.36 However, the applicable federal Reapportionment
Act of June 18, 1929,37 as noted above, "ha[d] no requirements 'as to the
compactness, contiguity, and equality in population of districts."'
3 8
Justice Frankfurter wrote for the majority that the redistricting issue was
a political question unfit for judicial resolution, concluding that "the
petitioners ask[ed] ... what is beyond [the Court's] competence to
grant"39 and that "[c]ourts ought not enter this political thicket. '4°
B. One-Person One- Vote: A Democratic Equalization Principle
Nonetheless, attitudes toward redistricting changed in the 1960s.
Baker v. Carr,4' like Colegrove, featured a scenario where a state
30. See Act of Feb. 2, 1872, ch. 11, 17 Stat. 28; Act of Aug. 8, 1911, ch. 5, 37 Stat.
13-14.
31. See Apportionment Act of 1911, ch. 5, 37 Stat. 13, 14 (mandating that members
of Congress "shall be elected by districts composed of a contiguous and compact
territory, and containing as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants").
32. See Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1, 6 (1932).
33. See ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 28, at 1193; see also Act of Dec. 14, 1967,
Pub. L. No. 90-196, 81 Stat. 581 (enacting 2 U.S.C. § 2a).
34. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
35. Id. at 550.
36. Id. at 552.
37. See Act of June 18, 1929, ch. 28, 46 Stat. 26; 2 U.S.C. § 2a (2012).
38. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 551 (quoting Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1, 8 (1932)).
39. Id. at 552.
40. Id. at 556.
41. Bakerv. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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(Tennessee) had failed to reapportion for over a generation.42
Unsurprisingly, the population had redistributed substantially over that
long period, resulting in allegations that Tennessee's distribution of
legislative seats was arbitrary and without any rational basis.43 The
Court explained that the case was justiciable because, inter alia,
"[j]udicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause [we]re well
developed and familiar, and it has been open to courts since the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the
particular facts they must, that a discrimination reflects no policy, but
simply arbitrary and capricious action."44  Although Baker did not
establish a one-person one-vote standard,45 it foreshadowed such a
standard by invoking the Equal Protection Clause to suggest that
apportionment questions were justiciable. Anticipating this, Justice
Frankfurter spent a substantial portion of his dissent in Baker explaining
that no clear equality principle could be discerned from the
Constitution-for example, the Constitution could have called for
"geographic" equality of representation as much as it may have
potentially called for "population" based equality of representation-and
it was not the Justices' role to choose "among competing theories of
political philosophy.""
Notwithstanding Justice Frankfurter's concerns, the Court
established the one-person one-vote standard in 1964 in Reynolds v.
Sims.4 7 Explaining that "the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in
a free and democratic society" that required strict scrutiny under the
Constitution,48 Reynolds identified the need for a principle to protect that
fundamental right. Chief Justice Warren famously proclaimed that
"[l]egislators represent people, not trees or acres,',49 and the rest is
history. The Reynolds Court explained that that "the Equal Protection
Clause requires that a [s]tate make an honest and good faith effort to
construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal
42. See id. at 191 ("In the more than 60 years since [the 1901 Apportionment Act],
all proposals in both Houses of the General Assembly for reapportionment have failed to
pass.").
43. See id. at 207; see also id. at 253 (Clark, J., concurring) ("It appears from the
record that 37% of the voters of Tennessee elect 20 of the 33 Senators while 40% of the
voters elect 63 of the 99 members of the House.").
44. Id. at 226 (majority opinion).
45. See, e.g., id. at 265 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[T]he Court does not say or imply
that 'state legislatures must be so structured as to reflect with approximate equality the
voice of every voter."' (quoting Harlan, J., dissenting)).
46. Baker, 369 U.S. at 300 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
47. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
48. Id. at 561-62.
49. Id. at 562.
2015]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
population as is practicable."50 Wesberry v. Sanders5 1 extended the one-
person one-vote principle to apply to congressional districts.52 Although
the Supreme Court tolerates state legislative districting schemes that
deviate from equal population by ten percent or more,53 it tolerates little
to no deviation from the equal population principle for congressional
districts.5 4 After these rulings, the Supreme Court was both ready and
willing, after each decennial census, to strike down electoral districting
plans that did not conform to these standards; thus, assuming any non-
negligible shifts in population after each decennial census, states that
failed to redraw electoral districts would likely face legal challenges.
C. Other Principles Under the Equal Protection Clause and Section
2 of the Voting Rights Act
Beyond the one-person one-vote principle, the Supreme Court
established other constitutional constraints on redrawn electoral districts.
Vote dilution was one such constraint. For example, although § 5 of the
Voting Rights Act has now been effectively nullified,55 that statute was
applied in numerous cases and did not allow covered jurisdictions to
redistrict after a census in ways "that would lead to a retrogression in the
position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the
electoral franchise.56 Moreover, under the Equal Protection Clause, the
Court, as early as 1973, compelled state multi-member districts to be
converted to single-member districts where the multi-member districts
effectively excluded blacks and Hispanics from the political process (that
is, they diluted these groups' voting strength).7 The Court retreated
50. Id. at 577.
51. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
52. Id. at 17-18.
53. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 323-29 (1973) (explaining that state
legislative districts may deviate somewhat from the equal population principle based on
the State's interest in regional representation and that the rule that applies to districts
applies to both houses of a state's legislature, including its senate); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth
Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 734-35 (1964).
54. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 732-33 (1983) (rejecting a
Congressional redistricting plan that resulted in a one percent population deviation
between the largest and smallest districts in the state of New Jersey).
55. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (effectively nullifying
§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act by striking down the coverage formula of § 4).
56. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976). Although Beer held that "a
legislative reapportionment that enhances the position of racial minorities with respect to
their effective exercise of the electoral franchise can hardly have the 'effect' of diluting
or abridging the right to vote on account of race within the meaning of § 5," it made clear
that schemes that had retrogressive effects would not be pre-cleared under § 5. Id.
57. The effective exclusions were due to a flawed primary process that disfavored
blacks as well as conditions, such as poor voter registration, that made it virtually
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from striking down districting schemes that only had discriminatory
effects and articulated an intentional discrimination requirement in
Mobile v. Bolden5" in 1980. However, in contrast to the constitutional
requirement, Congress amended § 2 of the Voting Rights Act in 1982 to
make clear that proof of an invidious purpose was not required to show a
§ 2 vote-dilution violation, and courts could assess objective factors to
determine whether challenged redistricting resulted in minorities being
denied equal access to the political process.
59
Congress's amendment of § 2 facilitated more challenges to
electoral districting schemes that impinged on the democratic voting
power of minorities. For example, in Thornburg v. Gingles,6° the
Supreme Court struck down a North Carolina redistricting plan similar to
the plans at issue in White v. Regester6 1 and Bolden, wherein black
voting power had been diluted in multi-member districts.62  In
Thornburg, the Supreme Court explained the conditions for establishing
whether a districting scheme encouraged racially polarized voting: a
districting scheme could be declared unlawful where (1) a minority
group is sufficiently large and compact to constitute a majority in a
single-member district; (2) the minority group is politically cohesive; and
(3) the districting scheme is nonetheless designed so that whites may
vote as a block to reject the minority group's preferred candidate.63
When these conditions were met, courts compelled lawmakers to redraw
districts in a race-conscious manner, such that the minority group could
impossible for Hispanics to elect candidates of their choice in the multi-member districts.
See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 767-68 (1973).
58. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980), superseded by
statutory amendment, Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012).
59. See, e.g., Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_2/about-sec2.php/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2015);
see also S. REP. No. 97-417, at 27 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 205. The
Senate Report states:
The amendment to the language of Section 2 is designed to make clear that
plaintiffs need not prove a discriminatory purpose in the adoption or
maintenance of the challenged system of practice in order to establish a
violation. Plaintiffs must either prove such intent, or, alternatively, must show
that the challenged system or practice, in the context of all the circumstances in
the jurisdiction in question, results in minorities being denied equal access to
the political process.
Id. (citation omitted).
60. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
61. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
62. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 34.
63. See id at 50-51. The Court also considers other factors set forth in Zimmer v.
McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973). These factors were also written in the
senate report accompanying the 1982 Amendment. See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 22.
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elect the candidate of its choice (as was possible in majority-minority
districts, for example).
Despite Gingles, the Court has made clear that lawmakers should
not draw majority-minority districts at every opportunity64 and has struck
down majority-minority districts where race was the predominant reason
for their creation,65 or where minorities are "packed" into a district so as
to create an overwhelming majority, preventing them from electing
candidates of their choice in other districts.66 Moreover, where efforts to
create a majority-minority district cannot yield an electoral district that is
greater than 50 percent minority, § 2 does not compel redistricting efforts
toward creating an "effective minority district" (that is, a district where a
coalition of minority and non-minority voters come together to vote for
the minority group's preferred candidate).67
As the above brief history illustrates, electoral districting has
evolved drastically over the past century. In the early 20th century, the
United States generally did not rely upon single-member districts to elect
its representatives, relying instead on primarily multi-member districts
and at-large elections. It was not until the middle of the century that
single-member electoral boundaries became ubiquitous, representing a
drastic departure from past practice. Initially, no uniform legal principles
guided single-member electoral districts, and indeed such boundaries
often remained unchanged despite drastic swings in population that
undermined democratic equality, as illustrated by both Colegrove and
Baker. Nonetheless, from a complete lack of a universal principle arose
64. For example, in Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1021-22 (1994), the
Court declined to strike down a districting plan wherein additional Hispanic majority-
minority districts could have been created where Hispanics' voting power statewide
approximately mirrored their proportion of the voting age population.
65. The Supreme Court has held that gerrymandering to create a majority-minority
district can be an equal protection violation where the resulting majority-minority district
comprises geographically segregated regions of the state. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630, 657-58 (1993). Similarly, courts have struck down districts drawn for
predominantly race-based reasons, ee Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 972 (1996), and
where the district tries to combine "two far-flung segments of a racial group with
disparate interests" in creating a majority-minority district. See League of United Latin
Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 433 (2006); see also Nicholas Stephanopoulos, The
Future of the Voting Rights Act, SLATE (Oct. 23, 2013, 4:37 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-andpolitics/jurisprudence/2013/10/section_2_of the
_votingrights act is more effective than_expected new research.html ("Section 2 ...
doesn't apply to districts that are strangely shaped or whose minority populations
fall below 50 percent or are too socioeconomically varied."). But see Easley v.
Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257 (2001) (declining to strike down a majority-minority
district where the record "d[id] not show that racial considerations predominated in the
drawing of District 12's boundaries" because the lines were drawn to achieve partisan
goals, rather than racial ones).
66. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 153-54 (1993).
67. See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 14 (2009).
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a democratic equalization principle-the one-person one-vote
principle-which finally forced states and localities around the nation to
think critically about how to design electoral districts to promote
democratic ends. Moreover, the racial vote dilution principles enforced
under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act compelled these states and localities
to reflect on the impact of redistricting efforts on the voting rights of
minority groups. Guided by these principles, electoral redistricting of
single-member districts is now an unquestioned fact, even though such
electoral boundaries rarely changed--or existed-less than a century
ago. As this Article will explain, this history should inform
policymakers' thinking about school district boundaries and our
willingness to change them.
II. THE PRIMACY OF LOCAL CONTROL SINCE BROWN AND
ENTRENCHED SCHOOL DISTRICT BOUNDARIES IN MODERN
EDUCATION LAW
Ever since Brown v. Board of Education,68 our nation has aspired
toward an ideal of equality of opportunity in education.69 Education, like
voting, is democracy-enhancing and is inextricably intertwined with the
electoral process. However, 60 years after Brown, educational inequities
persist.7v Local control, which has allowed school districts to take
exclusionary measures to "control every objectionable thing that may try
to enter [their] limits[,]" has perpetuated these inequalities.7 Thus, when
racially isolated minorities and low-income individuals from urban areas
sought refuge in suburban. school districts after Brown, schools denied
them access.7 2 School district boundaries have historically "divid[ed]
races and classes" because local governments took it upon themselves to
use, among other things, resident inspection and zoning laws to exclude
68. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
69. See id at 493.
70. Indeed, many recent books and articles have lamented the fact that Brown's
ideal has not been realized. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF
INTEGRATION 1, 24, 26 (1st paperback prtg. 2013); MARTHA MINOW, IN BROWN'S WAKE 5
(2010).
71. KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER 151 (1985) (quoting Editorial,
MORGAN PARK POST, Mar. 9, 1907).
72 See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 70, at 28 (discussing "exclusionary zoning"
that prevented blacks from moving to the suburbs); ALEXANDER POLIKOFF, WAITING FOR
GAUTREAUX: A STORY OF SEGREGATION, HOUSING, AND THE BLACK GHETTO 351 (2006)
(explaining that even after passage of the Fair Housing Act in 1968, "overwhelming"
evidence of housing discrimination persisted and blacks "were often steered to black
neighborhoods"); NANCY BuRNS, THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
35-37 (1994); J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE 223 (1979) ("Housing
policies, more than school decisions, had metropolitan consequences, because housing
discrimination in one jurisdiction, by definition, requires blacks to locate in another.").
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minorities and low-income families they deemed "objectionable.,
73
Such policies "encourage[] political fragmentation rather than
community" by promoting discrete units of government "reflective of
[each school district's] socioeconomic, ethnic, and ideological
character.' 74 Indeed, the exclusionary zoning practices struck down in
the celebrated NAACP v. Mount Laurel7 5 decision were rooted in a desire
to prevent the economically disadvantaged from entering an affluent
community.76 These policies and practices promote a damaging cycle
which fuels racial and class-based prejudices77 and thereby prevents
meaningful democratic deliberation across race and class. This is not to
say that local control is fundamentally antidemocratic. In fact, one of the
primary justifications for local control is that it allows communities to
democratically self-determine their educational polices, and some
undeniable benefits flow from local control of schooling.78
However, as this Part will explain, education law in the United
States has reinforced the primacy of local control of schools as a
nationwide policy-and has done so in ways that are antidemocratic.
Thus, in contrast to election law-where the Voting Rights Act and our
Supreme Court's precedents combine to employ fundamental principles
73. See BURNS, supra note 72, at 35-37; POLIKOFF, supra note 72, at 352. Polikoff
notes:
To housing discrimination must be added ubiquitous 'exclusionary zoning' by
suburban cities and towns-requiring large lot sizes, banning multifamily
housing, and the like .... [T]he effect of such zoning is to prevent poorer
families-disproportionately black-from even having a chance to rent or buy
in large portions of cities or towns from coast to coast.
Id.
74. GREGORY R. WEIHER, THE FRACTURED METROPOLIS 181 (A. Gary Dworkin ed.,
1991).
75. S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.
1975). Mount Laurel was a New Jersey Supreme Court case which held that
exclusionary zoning practices in a suburban community were unconstitutional. Id. at
187-88.
76. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 50 (1992). Briffault explains:
Mount Laurel was not so much antigrowth as concerned about the type of
growth that occurred. The town was open to development and new residents
provided they did not detract from the average wealth of the community. Nor
was Mount Laurel unusual. The court found that zoning had become a primary
weapon in the interlocal struggle for 'good ratables' and against the
immigration of residents who could increase local public service costs.
Id.
77. See GUTMANN, supra note 5, at 162 ("The problem is that not integrating
schools perpetuates racial prejudice among whites, which in turn perpetuates the most
damaging cycle of discrimination ever fostered by our society. De facto school
segregation is therefore unacceptable by democratic principles even it is often supported
by democratic politics.").
78. See infra Part III.C.
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that compel state and local governments to redraw electoral district
boundaries toward democratic ends--our law has merely acted to
entrench school district boundaries. Historically, courts 'have not viewed
these boundaries as malleable, but rather as fences that-in large part-
wall off socioeconomically and racially distinct groups from each other.
Accordingly, the courts-and particularly the Supreme Court-have
never endeavored to establish fundamental principles to guide the
creation and alteration of school district boundaries to promote
democratic ends.
A. Green, Swann, and Flexible Desegregation Remedies After
Brown
The picture did not always seem so bleak. Although the Supreme
Court did little to promote school integration in the initial years
following Brown,79 it did show signs that it would affirmatively compel
integration in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Court even arguably
suggested that school district boundaries were not sacrosanct.
1. Flexible Remedies in Large County-Wide School Districts
First, in Green v. County School Board,80 the Court struck down a
county school board's "freedom of choice" plan as unconstitutional.
Under this plan, the school district had no defined attendance zone and
therefore was an "at-large" district where black students could "choose"
to go to white schools and vice versa. But the Court ruled that this was
not enough to comply with Brown: "the fact that in 1965 the Board
opened the doors of the former 'white' school to [n]egro children and of
the '[n]egro' school to white children merely begins, not ends, our
inquiry whether the Board has taken steps adequate to abolish its dual,
segregated system.",8' And beginning the inquiry there, it was clear that
the "free choice" plan had not worked as 85 percent of the black children
in the district continued to attend the black school that had been
established pre-Brown.82 Thus, the school board was "charged with the
affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to
79. Many, for example, are familiar with its admonition to remedy segregation with
"all deliberate speed" in Brown v. Bd of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
See also WILKINSON, supra note 72, at 79 ("From 1955 to 1968 the Supreme Court
remained largely inactive in school desegregation.... [Its] pronouncements, important as
they were, failed to touch the real problem, which was understood all along to be school
desegregation.").
80. Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
81. Id. at437.
82. Id. at 441.
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a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root
and branch.,83 Although the Court did not categorically reject "freedom
of choice" plans, the Court made clear that, where there are "reasonably
available other ways, such.., as zoning, promising speedier and more
effective conversion to a unitary, nonracial school system, 'freedom of
choice' must be held unacceptable.84 Given its endorsement of rezoning
as a tool to promote integration, it seemed that the Court was
encouraging school districts to take significant steps-including altering
attendance boundaries within the district-to achieve integration.
The Court's decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education seemed at first blush to continue along this same course.85
Charlotte-Mecklenburg, a large county school district that comprised
over 550 square miles and served over 84,000 students, had failed to
desegregate as of 1969-15 years after Brown. Two-thirds of the black
students in the district, for example, still attended schools that were over
99 percent black in population.86 In response, the district court created a
plan-the Finger Plan-that used high-school attendance zones that were
shaped like the wedges of a pie; while oddly shaped, these attendance
zones allowed the district to reassign black students to the outlying
portions of the district that were predominately white.87 The proposal
would also rezone junior high attendance areas and create "satellite
zones."88 For elementary schools, the Finger Plan proposed a strategy
that used pairing and grouping techniques in addition to zoning.89 The
strategy promised to achieve a 9 percent to 38 percent range of black
enrollment in elementary schools and a roughly 17 percent to 36 percent
black enrollment in high schools,90 as opposed to the 99 percent black
enrollment that had been typical before.9' Invoking Green, the Swann
Court lamented the "dilatory tactics" that were preventing integration in
Charlotte-Mecklenburg and issued additional guidance.9 It explained
that the school district could alter attendance zones and that bus
83. Id. at 437-38.
84. Id. at441.
85. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1971).
86. Id. at7.
87. Id. at 8-9.
88. Id. at9.
89. Id. at 9.
90. Swann, 402 U.S. at 9. In addition to achieving better integration, the district
court's Finger Plan also required less busing than the school district's proposed plan. See
POLIKOFF, supra note 72, at 131.
91. Swann,402 U.S. at7.
92. Id. at 13 ("Deliberate resistance of some to the Court's mandates has impeded
the good-faith efforts of others to bring school systems into compliance. The detail and




transportation, having been "an integral part of the public education
system for years" and an "accepted tool of educational policy," could be
utilized to reassign students to schools within those altered attendance
zones.
93
These decisions seemed particularly promising for the "idea" of
malleable school district boundaries. Though both Green and Swann
concerned a single school district and only endorsed the idea of
redrawing attendance zones within those particular districts, both
appeared to stand for the principle that desegregation remedies could
include relatively far reaching solutions that included both busing and
redrawing attendance boundaries. However, as the education reform
community would learn, this interpretation ignored Swann's fine print.
2. Swann's Fine Print
Despite the aspects of Swann that suggested it was a "great liberal
victory," the case also foreshadowed the Court's impending emphasis on
local control and the limited scope of school district integration
remedies.94 It was not clear that courts would prescribe rezoning, busing,
and reassignment remedies in future cases, even though Swann
seemingly endorsed them. As the Court explained:
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to
formulate and implement educational policy and might well
conclude, for example, that in order to prepare students to live in a
pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed ratio of
[n]egro to white students reflecting the proportion for the district as a
whole. To do this as an educational policy is within the broad
discretionary powers of school authorities;95 absent a finding of a
constitutional violation, however, that would not be within the
authority of a federal court. As with any equity case, the nature of
the violation determines the scope of the remedy.96
Thus, without a constitutional violation, a presumption existed that
only local school boards and districts-and not the courts-had
discretionary authority to remedy segregation. Meanwhile, what a
"violation" looked like remained unclear: the Court declined to answer
whether "a showing that school segregation is a consequence of other
93. Id. at 29-30.
94. See WILKINSON, supra note 72, at 147-48.
95. Swann, 402 U.S. at 16. Interestingly, such an overt racial balancing policy,
though said to be squarely "within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities"
in Swann, even if voluntary, would now be unconstitutional under Parents Involved in
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 at 721. See infra Part II.C.
96. Swann, 402 U.S. at 16 (emphasis added).
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types of state action, without any discriminatory action by the school
authorities, is a constitutional violation requiring remedial action by a
school desegregation decree."97 In other words, the Court declined to
answer the question of whether exclusionary zoning practices by states or
municipalities (or other state practices that promote segregated schools)
would warrant a desegregation remedy. This would be a difficult
question, as the Court had no principle or theory from which it could
analyze whether a desegregation violation had occurred.
B. Rodriguez, Milliken, and Inflexible Boundaries
As discussed above, courts did not always assume that voting was a
"fundamental right" or that all voters were entitled to an equally-
weighted vote for a candidate elected from single-member electoral
districts-these principles were not formally adopted until Reynolds, and
the cases that followed established the one-person one-vote principle.98
In Reynolds, along with cases like Baker, the Justices observed statewide
electoral schemes with entrenched boundaries that instinctively felt
problematic because of the drastic disparities in population between
electoral districts. It appears that the Justices viewed voting as so
fundamental that they felt morally compelled to adopt a democratic
principle to preserve that right-and such a principle was apparent to
them. Thus, they established the one-person one-vote principle, even
though the states had already adopted electoral boundaries, and electoral
structures had taken myriad different forms. The Voting Rights Act and
other legal principles-such as those governing racial vote dilution
claims-soon followed. Nevertheless, prior to Reynolds, nothing in the
Constitution compelled these results in the education law context, and
the Court could just as easily have chosen to enter the political thicket in
education.99  Despite the similar democracy-enhancing benefits of
education to society, San Antonio v. Rodriguez and the cases that
followed illustrated that the Court would not adopt such a democratic
principle in the education context.
97. Id. at 23.
98. See supra Part 1.
99. Our constitutional history does not compel the one-person, one-vote principle:
for example, Justice Frankfurter explained that there were many possible equality
principles that could have guided an equal protection analysis in the electoral process.
See supra Part I.B. Indeed, that the principle of geographic equality is enshrined in our
Constitution is reflected in the fact that, by the Constitution's design, drastically different
numbers of people in each state elect equal numbers of senators to this day. Moreover,
nothing in the Constitution even compels an affirmative right to vote, as voting rights are
only expressed in the negative; and "the original Constitution reflected a particularly elite
conception of democratic politics," concentrating the franchise in property-holding, male
elites. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 28, at 8.
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1. Rodriguez: No Fundamental Right to Education
When confronted with the opportunity to proclaim that the
Constitution protected education as a fundamental right, the Rodriguez
Court did not have the same instinct as the Reynolds and Baker Courts.
Rodriguez presented the "fundamental right" question in the context of a
school finance lawsuit; such lawsuits challenge the constitutionality of
school funding regimes that allocate education funds based on local
property taxes. Although such regimes aim to ensure that each district
receives a "foundation level" of school funding, wealthier school districts
are invariably left with far more resources to educate their students than
poorer districts despite the fact that poorer districts typically tax their
residents at higher rates.'0
Confronted with the constitutionality of such an inequitable regime,
the Court declined to adopt a democratic equalization principle of "equal
funding" for schools, despite the fact that it viewed education as
democracy-enhancing.10 1 Though it acknowledged the importance of
education to democracy, the Court explained that it "ha[s] never
presumed to possess either the ability or the authority to guarantee to the
citizenry the most effective speech or the most informed electoral
choice."'1 2 Thus, while the Court recognized the fundamental right to
participate in elections on an equal basis,'0 3 it declined to establish such a
100. Such was the case in'Rodriguez. See Michael Heise, The Story of San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez: School Finance, Local Control, and
Constitutional Limits, in EDUCATION LAW STORIEs 51, 53 (Michael A. Olivas & Ronna
Greff Schneider eds., 2008). Heise describes per pupil spending in 1968:
In 1968, the distribution of school resources in Texas followed a pattern typical
for that era. Per pupil spending in Edgewood, an overwhelmingly poor and
minority school district, was $356, while per pupil spending in the
predominately white and affluent neighboring Alamo Heights district was
$594, or two-thirds more....
Making matters worse was that the per pupil spending disparity arose ven
though Edgewood residents taxed themselves at a rate higher than the Alamo
Heights residents.
Id. (citations omitted).
101. Emphasizing the "vital role of education in a free society," the Court made clear
that "[c]ompulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society."
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30 (1973). The Court also did
not dispute that "[t]he electoral process, if reality is to conform to the democratic ideal,
depends on an informed electorate: a voter cannot cast his ballot intelligently unless his
reading skills and thought processes have been adequately developed." Id. at 35-36.
102. Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
103. See id. at 34 n.74 ("Dunn fully canvasses this Court's voting rights cases and
explains that 'this Court has made clear that a citizen has a constitutionally protected
right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction."'
(quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972)). Moreover, in Justice Stewart's
concurrence, citing Reynolds, Kramer, and Dunn, he admitted that "[i]t has been
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right-or a remedy-in the education context.'0 4 At the point education
was not recognized as a fundamental right, it is unsurprising that the
Court failed to establish a democratic equalization principle to enforce
that right. Indeed, it was precisely because the Warren Court "framed
the obligation to reapportion on an equipopulational basis as an
individual right to an equally weighted franchise" that it could adopt the
one-person one-vote principle without colliding head-on with the
political question doctrine.'l5
In contrast to voting, where the democratic equalization principle
that could be used to ensure equal voting rights seemed somewhat clear,
the solution was not so apparent in education. When Rodriguez, a school
funding case, is juxtaposed against Brown and its progeny, serious
questions arise about the meaning of "equality of opportunity" in the
educational context. For example, once the Supreme Court opens the
door to school funding challenges, difficult questions arise regarding the
appropriate levels of funding necessary to provide equal educational
opportunities.106 As one commentator has noted, "[n]o doubt owing to
the complexity and uncertainty surrounding these issues, courts since
Rodriguez remain split over their understanding of the relation between
school funding and student achievement."10 7 Similar challenges attach to
establishing a clear desegregation principle. As discussed in the next
subsection, "local control" would become a touchstone of education law
that has enabled courts to defer to school district boundaries that have
become entrenched as a result of local decision-making. But as at least
one scholar has explained, "[t]he deference to local school authorities has
become a leading remedial approach in part because the other factors for
established in recent years that the Equal Protection Clause confers the substantive right
to participate on an equal basis with other qualified voters whenever the State has
adopted an electoral process for determining who will represent any segment of the
State's population." Id. at 59 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring).
104. This was the case even though-as with education-an affirmative right to vote
is not expressly mentioned in the Constitution. See id. at 34 n.74 (majority opinion)
(noting that "[t]he constitutional underpinnings of the right to equal treatment in the
voting process can no longer be doubted even though, as the court noted in Harper v.
Virginia Bd of Elections, 383 U.S. at 665, 'the right to vote in state elections is nowhere
expressly mentioned"' in the Constitution).
105. See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARv. L.
REv. 593, 608 (2002).
106. I have discussed this in my review of two books that provide detailed insights
into school finance litigation. See generally Christopher A. Suarez, Courthouse,
Statehouse, or Both? Redefining Institutional Roles in School Finance Litigation, 28
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 539 (2010).
107. Heise, supra note 100, at 64.
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determining the scope of the school desegregation remedy are highly
indeterminate.
'' 08
2. Milliken: "Local Control" Prevails
In the voting cases described in Part I.B., the Court seemed
unconcerned with the disruptive nature of its creation of the one-person
one-vote principle, notwithstanding the fact that the principle would
uproot state and local election systems and the boundaries that were used
in those systems. In education cases, in contrast, the Court was
concerned with the effect that analogous remedies may have on local
control over educational policy. Rodriguez invoked local control as a
rational basis for the inequitable school finance scheme upheld there
because, "[w]hile assuring a basic education for every child in the [s]tate,
it permits and encourages a large measure of participation in and control
of each district's schools at the local level."'0 9
After Rodriguez constitutionalized local control, the Court in
Milliken v. Bradley reconfirmed its importance one year later. 10 In
Milliken, Detroit had undertaken measures to promote segregation within
its school system, and the question was about the scope of the remedy for
the intentional discrimination within the district. Because a remedial
solution that only included Detroit students would have left many
schools 75 to 90 percent black, District Judge Roth adopted a
metropolitan, inter-district remedy which would comprise 780,000
students from several districts, 310,000 of which would be transported to
school by bus.11
District Judge Roth believed that the segregation in inner-city
Detroit was a metropolitan problem that required a metropolitan solution.
Besides Detroit's perpetuated intentional segregation, the judge made
findings that governments "at all levels, federal, state[,] and local, have
combined, with... private organizations, such as loaning institutions and
real estate associations and brokerage firms, to establish ... residential
segregation throughout the Detroit metropolitan area,""' 2 and that
government entities advocated racially segregated, "harmonious"
108. Wendy Parker, Connecting the Dots: Grutter, School Desegregation, and
Federalism, 45 WM. & MARY. L. REv. 1691, 1737 (2004); see also id. ("The school
desegregation right is largely unknowable without reference to the remedy."); id. at 1743
("[I]n school desegregation the connection between right and remedy is so exceptionally
close that distinction between the two is largely meaningless.").
109. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49 (1973).
110. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
111. WILKINSON, supra note 72, at 218-19.
112. Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 587 (E.D. Mich. 1971), rev'd, 418 U.S.
717 (1974).
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neighborhoods.11 3 Thus, metropolitan housing policies which promoted
segregation had contributed to Detroit's segregation. Nonetheless, the
Sixth Circuit, in reviewing the district court record, did not "rel[y] at all
upon testimony pertaining to segregated housing."' 14 Thus, the Supreme
Court would decline to address the housing question-just as it would
fail to address the exclusionary zoning question in Swann. 115
By eliminating housing and exclusionary zoning from the equation,
the only remaining evidence relied upon to support the metropolitan
remedy had been the intentional efforts of school officials in Detroit to
segregate its schools. The record showed no evidence of intentional
efforts by school officials in Detroit's suburbs to maintain the
segregation that persisted throughout the greater metropolitan area.
This brings us back to Swann's fine print, 16 which explained that
"the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy."' 17 The
Milliken Court invoked this legalism and explained that the only
"condition alleged to offend the Constitution" was "the segregation
within the Detroit City School District."" 8 Because the Court framed the
"violation" (which did not include housing), as being confined to
Detroit's "condition," the remedy could not cross school district
boundary lines. The Court then invoked local control and explained that:
Boundary lines may be bridged where there has been a constitutional
violation calling for interdistrict relief, but the notion that school
district lines may be casually ignored or treated as a mere
administrative convenience is contrary to the history of public
education in our country. No single tradition in public education is
more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools;
local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the
113. Specifically, Judge Roth found that "for many years FHA [Federal Housing
Administration] and VA [the Veterans Administration] openly advised and advocated the
maintenance of 'harmonious' neighborhoods, i.e., racially and economically harmonious.
The conditions created continue." Id. Further, "[t]he affirmative obligation of the
[school] [b]oard has been and is to adopt and implement pupil assignment practices and
policies that compensate for and avoid incorporation into the school system the effects of
residential racial segregation." Id. at 593.
114. Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 242 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717
(1974).
115. See supra Part III.A.2.
116. See supra Part III.A.2
117. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 738 (1974) (emphasis added).
118. See id The Court also expressed concerns that the originally filed complaint did
not seem to envision a multidistrict remedy, notwithstanding the fact that there was some
evidence of a metropolitan violation in the record. See id. at 752 n.24 ("Apparently,
when the District Court, sua sponte, abruptly altered the theory of the case to include the
possibility of multidistrict relief, neither the plaintiffs nor the trial judge considered
amending the complaint to embrace the new theory.").
770 [Vol. 119:3
DEMOCRATIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
maintenance of community concern and support for public schools
and to quality of the educational process. 
19
However, this notion of local control had virtually nothing to do with
local educational policy in terms of the instruction offered or the
educational approaches of the district-instead, the Court's ruling
endorsed that aspect of local control that promotes exclusion and
entrenched boundaries. Because of this ruling, parties now needed to
show intentional discrimination by suburban school districts to have any
chance of obtaining an interdistrict remedy-otherwise, courts could not
impose a remedy beyond the city limits. 120 For example, if a party could
show that an adjacent school district drew its district lines or used other
intentional means to promote interdistrict segregation, an interdistrict
remedy against that district may have been possible. 121
Of course, nothing in the record showed that the district lines were
intentionally drawn to promote race discrimination. The Court
emphasized that:
The boundaries of the Detroit School District, which are coterminous
with the boundaries of the city of Detroit, were established over a
century ago by neutral legislation when the city was incorporated;
there is no evidence from the record, nor is there any suggestion by
the respondents, that either the original boundaries of the Detroit
School District, or any other school district in Michigan, were
established for the purpose of creating, maintaining, or perpetuating
segregation of races.' 
22
Of course, the legislation that-in various states-fixed electoral
boundaries for decades in violation of the one-person one-vote principle
had similarly been fixed for decades pursuant to ostensibly neutral
legislation.123 Proof of such intentional efforts to promote segregation
using these boundaries would have been virtually impossible to obtain.
124
119. Id. at 741-42.
120. The Milliken Court explained that an interdistrict remedy was not justified
because there was "no showing of significant violation by the 53 outlying school districts
and no evidence of any interdistrict violation or effect." Id. at 745.
121. See id (concluding that "racially discriminatory acts of the state or local school
districts, or of a single school district have been a substantial cause of interdistrict
segregation" to obtain an interdistrict remedy, such as where "the racially discriminatory
acts of one or more school districts caused racial segregation in an adjacent district, or
where district lines have been deliberately drawn on the basis of race").
122. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 748.
123. See, e.g., supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
124. The analysis would perhaps be different if a state assumed the duty of
periodically redrawing school district boundaries, however, because in such a situation
maintaining discriminatory boundaries could arguably be viewed as an intentional effort
to maintain segregation.
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And although the Supreme Court explained that school district
boundaries were not sacrosanct in theory,25 they would be in practice as
a result of the Court's decision.
In the words of Judge Wilkinson some 35 years ago, "Milliken...
was an act of absolution."'' 26  And Judge Edwards-one of the Sixth
Circuit judges who had heard Milliken on appeal-said that the Supreme
Court's decision:
imbued school district boundaries... with a constitutional
significance which neither federal nor state law had ever accorded
them .... [I]t can come to represent a formula for American
Apartheid. I know of no decision by the Supreme Court of the
United States since the Dred Scott decision which is so fraught with
disaster for this country.1
27
These predictions have thus far been proven correct, as school district
boundaries between cities and suburbs have remained virtually
unchanged since the ruling,128 and the Supreme Court has only reinforced
the principles of local control and rigid boundaries that produced the
125. Specifically, Milliken recognized that "[slchool district lines and the present
laws with respect to local control, are not sacrosanct and if they conflict with the
Fourteenth Amendment federal courts have a duty to prescribe appropriate remedies."
Milliken, 418 U.S. at 744. Also, Milliken cited various cases wherein states or localities
took affirmative steps with respect to district boundaries that were constitutionally
problematic:
See, e.g., Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 453 (1972);
United States v. Scotland Neck Board of Education, 407 U.S. 484, 489 (1972)
(state or local officials prevented from carving out a new school district from
an existing district that was in process of dismantling a dual school system); cf
Haney v. County Board of Education of Sevier County, 429 F.2d 364, 367
(CA8 1970) (State contributed to separation of races by drawing of school
district lines); United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043 (ED Tex. 1970), aff'd
447 F.2d 441 (CA5 1971) . . . (one or more school districts created and
maintained for one race)....
Id. Justice Stewart's concurrence similarly recognized the propriety of interdistrict
remedies where, for example:
[S]tate officials had contributed to the separation of the races by drawing or
redrawing school district lines, by transfer of school units between districts, or
by purposeful racially discriminatory use of state housing or zoning laws, then
a decree calling for transfer of pupils across district lines or for restructuring of
district lines....
Id. at 755 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
126. WILKINSON, supra note 72, at 224.
127. Bradley v. Milliken, 519 F.2d 679, 680-81 (6th Cir. 1975) (Edwards, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted).
128. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, MAKING THE GRADE: THE ECONOMIC EVOLUTION
OF AMERICAN SCHOOL DISTRICTS 214-15 (2009) (explaining that the school district
boundaries of Chicago's suburbs remain virtually unchanged since 1938 and that the




socioeconomic and racial segregation at issue in Milliken. l2 9 In light of
these trends, one can hardly expect any federal court to take affirmative
steps to redraw school district boundaries in the near future.
C. Parents Involved and Its Impact on Race-Based School
Redistricting
Due to § 2 of the Voting Rights Act and equal protection vote-
dilution standards, states can-and must-rely upon race in redrawing
electoral district boundaries. Indeed, if it is possible to draw a new
majority-minority district based on demographic or other shifts, a state
runs a risk of a legal challenge if it does not redraw boundaries to
account for that shift in racial demography. State legislators and
policymakers must consider ace-at least to some degree-in ensuring
democratic equality with respect to voting. This is true regardless of
whether a § 2 or equal protection violation has been demonstrated in the
state that performs the redistricting, because the state has a continual
duty to fulfill the requirements of those laws.
The same cannot be said, however, in the context of school districts.
In Parents Involved v. Seattle School District No. 1,130 school districts in
Louisville and Seattle sought to reduce racial and socioeconomic
isolation within their own school district boundaries.131  In so doing,
these districts used race as a factor to assign students to schools within
the district. When parents of white students challenged this practice after
the school district denied their children access to their preferred schools,
the Supreme Court seized the opportunity to place strong limitations on
voluntary, affirmative efforts to integrate schools. The case divided the
Court four to one to four. The plurality opinion, written by Chief Justice
Roberts and joined by the most conservative members of the Court, held
129. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 92-94 (1995) (rejecting a remedy
ordering "the interdistrict transfer of students" where the district court "created a magnet
district of the [Kansas City Metropolitan School District] in order to serve the
interdistrict goal of attracting nonminority students from the surrounding [Suburban
School District's] and redistributing them within the [Kansas City District]" because that
remedy was "beyond the scope" of the District Court's authority in that case) (emphasis
added). As one commentator explained, "Jenkins officially completed a process that
Milliken prompted-federal judicial blessing to district boundaries, even in the face of
regional inequity in either student makeup (Milliken) or school quality (Jenkins)." Kiel,
supra note 24, at 143; see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
551 U.S. 701, 721 (2007) ("We have emphasized that the harm being remedied by
mandatory desegregation plans is the harm that is traceable to segregation, and that the
Constitution is not violated by racial imbalance in the schools, without more.") (internal
quotation omitted).
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that there was no compelling interest in using race to assign students
when it was not necessary to remedy past intentional discrimination
committed by the school district.32 Because this opinion did not carry a
majority, however, courts recognize Justice Kennedy's opinion, which
provided the fifth vote for the majority, as the controlling opinion in the
case. Justice Kennedy made clear that the plans at issue in Parents
Involved were unconstitutional because they only used race to assign
students to schools within the district.133  He, moreover, rejected the
plurality's conclusion that affirmative efforts to integrate schools were
not a legitimate interest, noting that:
School districts can seek to reach Brown's objective of equal
educational opportunity. The plurality opinion is at least open to the
interpretation that the Constitution requires school districts to ignore
the problem of de facto resegregation in schooling. I cannot endorse
that conclusion. To the extent the plurality opinion suggests that the
Constitution mandates that state and local authorities must accept the
status quo of racial isolation in schools, it is, in my view, profoundly
mistaken. 1
34
Ultimately, then, Kennedy left the door somewhat ajar in Parents
Involved. He made clear that "[s]chool boards may pursue the goal of
bringing together students of diverse backgrounds and races" by using
methods that may take race into account to some degree, such as
"strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with
general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating
resources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a
targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other
statistics by race."'135 What districts cannot do, however, is assign each
student to a school "according to a crude system of individual racial
132. Id. at 720-2 1. The Court reasoned:
[P]rior cases, in evaluating the use of racial classifications in the school
context, have recognized two interests that qualify as compelling. The first is
the compelling interest of remedying the effects of past intentional
discrimination. Yet the Seattle public schools have not shown that they were
ever segregated by law, and were not subject to court-ordered desegregation
decrees. The Jefferson County public schools were previously segregated by
law and were subject to a desegregation decree entered in 1975. In 2000, the
District Court that entered that decree dissolved it....
Id. (citations omitted).
133. Justice Kennedy made clear that districts "are free to devise race-conscious
measures to address the [diversity] problem in a general way and without treating each
student in different fashion solely on the basis of a systematic, individual typing by race."
Id. at 788-89 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 788.
135. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 789.
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classifications.' '3  In assigning students, "[r]ace may be one
component... but other demographic factors, plus special talents and
needs, should also be considered.'17  After Parents Involved, various
school districts have implemented desegregation plans that use race-
neutral factors (such as socioeconomic status) to assign students,138 and
race-conscious efforts to redraw attendance zones within school districts
may be permissible. 1
39
Interestingly, despite its preeminence in Rodriguez and Milliken,
local control did not take center stage in Parents Involved. The plurality
opinion did not mention it at all. The dissent emphasized the irony that,
despite past decisions that placed such great importance on local control,
the Court was rejecting the local educational decisions of local school
boards.40 Dismissing the dissent's discussion of local control as merely
"rhetorical," Justice Kennedy failed to meaningfully engage the local
control question. 141
III. LESSONS LEARNED AND LEGAL FOUNDATIONS FOR A DEMOCRATIC
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION PROPOSAL
Courts and policymakers can draw several lessons from the
descriptive discussion above, which makes clear that voting and
education-while similar in terms of . their democracy-enhancing
effects-have followed drastically different legal trajectories. These
lessons, once assembled, form the foundation for this Article's
democratic school desegregation proposal. Here, this Article will
describe the various lessons learned.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 798.
138. See Erica Frankenberg, Integration After Parents Involved: What Does Research
Suggest About Available Options, in INTEGRATING SCHOOLS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 53,
58-60 (Erica Frankenberg & Elizabeth DeBray eds., 2011).
139. Id. at 57 (reasoning that geographical boundary redrawing within districts may
comply with Parents Involved "[b]ecause such plans consider the racial composition of a
neighborhood, and not of an individual student").
140. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 849 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Indeed, in the
context of school desegregation, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of
acknowledging that local school boards better understand their own communities and
have a better knowledge of what in practice will best meet the ducational needs of their
pupils.").
141. Id. at 791 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The dissent emphasizes local control, the
unique history of school desegregation, and the fact that these plans make less use of race
than prior plans, but these factors seem more rhetorical than integral to the analytical
structure of the opinion.").
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A. Seemingly Arbitrary Boundaries Have Highly Consequential
Results.
1. School District Boundaries Vary Widely Across the United
States.
School districts in the United States are of numerous different sizes
and configurations. Different geographical and regional conditions have
led to these different configurations. An understanding of these
differences is useful in understanding the interplay between school
district boundaries and their impact on democratic outcomes in
education. William Fischel performed the most comprehensive study of
American school districts to date. His study makes clear that the sizes of
school districts vary widely across the United States based on various
regional factors.142 In much of the North and West, school district lines
are frequently not coterminous with town boundaries and cross county
lines,143 while district lines in the New England states are frequently
coterminous with the town lines.144 Some district lines, in fact, even
cross state lines and exist by virtue of interstate compacts or other
arrangements.145  Districts in the South tend to be larger and
consolidated, as many such states had minimized the effects of black
influence by disenfranchising black voters and diluting their voting
power by operating larger districts.146 Indeed, as Fischel explains:
Disfranchisement was specifically embraced so that schools could be
locally controlled by whites. In much of the South, the combination
of disfranchisement and local taxation to expand educational
opportunities for whites was regarded as a progressive idea. Once
the possibility that blacks could swing local funds toward themselves
was eliminated, white constitution makers felt confident enough to
permit localities to tax themselves for schools. 147
Thus, lawmakers had effectively created the larger school districts of the
South to dilute the black vote. But, in an interesting irony, by making
the districts larger to dilute black influence, those large districts were
subject to broader desegregation orders post-Brown, based on the "scope
142. See FISCHEL, supra note 128, at 159-61. Indeed, Fischel uses Google Earth to
identify six categories of school district boundaries, ranging from districts that are
virtually coterminous with town lines to those where town lines may span three or more
school districts. See id. at 200-01, 201 fig.5.6.
143. Id. at 161.
144. Id. at 162-63.
145. Id. at 163-64.
146. Id. at 174-75.
147. FISCHEL, supra note 128, at 175.
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of the violation" remedial jurisprudence advanced in Swann, Milliken,
and other cases.
148
Although states eliminated 90 percent of American school districts
between 1930 and 1970,149 the North was less willing than the South to
consolidate its school districts into larger districts.50 Because northern
states have far smaller school districts than those in the southern states, it
is much more difficult to obtain a broad desegregation remedy in a
northern state, especially in light of Milliken. Courts and policymakers
cannot expect these -boundaries (or their permeability) to change any time
soon, absent either a legal or cultural shift. These boundaries are
entrenched to ensure that fences are maintained between members of
different socioeconomic and racial classes,51 and the Supreme Court has
put up barriers of its own that prevent meaningful challenges to the
practices that maintain those fences. 1
5 2
148. As Fischel explains, "[t]he modern irony is that the South's oversize school
districts, which were created to assure white control of black schools, now make it
difficult for Southern whites to avoid desegregation by moving to the suburbs with
independent school districts." Id. at 183.
149. See Kiel, supra note 24, at 140; Saiger, supra note 6, at 510 ("The fewer than
15,000 school districts that existed in the United States in 1970 are the successors to
approximately 200,000 school districts that existed in 1900."); Change Is a Constant for
US School Districts, MAPONICS, http://www.maponics.com/about-us/resources/school-
geography-guide/change-is-a-constant-for-us-school-districts (la t visited Jan. 25, 2015)
("Of the 200,000 districts that existed in 1900, fewer than 14,000 still exist. Because of
continuing and sometimes dramatic population shifts and economic factors, many areas
of the country are grappling with the need to redraw school district boundaries.").
150. See FISCHEL, supra note 128, at 211 ("Suburban residents were uniformly and
strongly opposed to city-suburb consolidation because they thought school quality would
decline and taxes would rise.").
151. See WEIHER, supra note 74, at 191-92. Weiher explains:
Quite frequently, [school district boundaries] . . . are social boundaries,
separating socioeconomic and ethnic groups from one another. This is not
accidental. Research in one metropolitan area after another indicates that this
congruence of political, geographic, and social boundaries is often created by
decisions taken within the educational system expressly for that purpose.
Id. (citations omitted). As noted above, these boundaries are maintained using zoning
and other intentional mechanisms. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF
INTEGRATION 12, 39 (2010) ("Where once whites kept blacks down by legally prohibiting
anyone from teaching them to read, now an elaborate set of laws-including
fragmentation of local governments, zoning regulations, and local financing of schools-
works with nonlegal mechanisms sustaining residential r cial segregation to exclude
blacks from good schools."); Saiger, supra note 6, at 503.
152. See WEIHER, supra note 74, at 94. Weiher summarizes:
In a series of cases, the court upheld a California law which required that local
voters approve all public housing proposals; upheld the right of localities to
engage in restrictive zoning; and imposed a strict standard that zoning
prohibiting subsidized housing should be invalidated only if intent to
discriminate on racial grounds is proven.
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2. Swann and Milliken Involved Similar Circumstances But
Different Boundaries.
These pre-determined boundaries have had profound consequences
on the legal results in school desegregation cases such as Swann and
Milliken.'53 The difference in outcomes in those cases illustrates the
apparent arbitrariness of school district boundaries in impacting a
locality's ability to create policies that promote socioeconomic and racial
integration. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg district was about the same size
as the area covered by the metropolitan remedy rejected in Milliken. It
would have taken a fairly long bus ride to get from one side of the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district to the other, just as it would have
for the students who would have been part of Detroit's consolidated
school plan contemplated in Milliken. 5 4  But Milliken's metropolitan
remedy, unlike the remedy in Swann, would have spanned multiple
school districts. Thus, the boundaries of the districts were different, but
the experiences of students in each integration plan would have been
similar. Had the district boundaries simply been different in Milliken,
the segregated conditions would have likely been akin to those at issue in
Swann, where the Court upheld the metropolitan remedy.
3. Gautreaux: Are "Housing Market Boundaries" Conceptually
Distinct from "School District Boundaries"?
Hills v. Gautreaux, 55 although a housing case,'56 further illustrates
the arbitrary nature of boundaries that govern legal outcomes. In
Gautreaux, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
Id. (citing James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Viii. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U.S. 1 (1974); Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977)).
153. See supra Part II.A-B.
154. Cf FISCHEL, supra note 128, at 183 ("Many of the largest cities in the South are
within unified city-country school districts, such as Miami-Date, Florida, Charlotte-
Mecklenburg, North Carolina, and Nashville-Davidson, Tennessee, from which a 'flight
to the suburbs' is a long trip indeed.").
155. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
156. As many have stated or implied, "education policy is housing policy." See
Lewis W. Diuguid, Continued Segregation Is Failure of Brown Ruling, THE KANSAS
CITY STAR (May 11, 2014, 5:00 PM),
http://www.kansascity.com/2014/05/11/5013949/continued-segregation-is-failure.html
(quoting the Economic Policy Institute); see also WILKINSON, supra note 72, at 223
(reasoning that in the school desegregation context, "victimization could not be
understood or genuine restoration attempted without looking at housing"); Heather
Schwartz, Housing Policy Is School Policy: Economically Integrative Housing Promotes
Academic Success in Montgomery County, Maryland, in THE FuTURE OF SCHOOL
INTEGRATION, supra note 18, at 27.
[Vol. 119:3
DEMOCRATIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
("HUD") and the Chicago Housing Authority ("CHA") had
discriminated on the basis of race in administering its housing programs
in the greater Chicagoland area.'57 The question was whether the remedy
for this housing discrimination should extend beyond Chicago. The
United States argued that Milliken should apply and constrain the remedy
to Chicago's city limits. The Court, however, concluded that:
[I]t [was] entirely appropriate and consistent with Milliken to order
CHA and HUD to attempt to create housing alternatives for the
respondents in the Chicago suburbs. Here the wrong committed by
HUD confined the respondents to segregated public housing. The
relevant geographic area for purposes of the respondents' housing
options is the Chicago housing market, not the Chicago city limits.158
Moreover, the Court distinguished Milliken on the grounds that that
ruling "reflected the substantive impact of a consolidation remedy on
separate and independent school districts."'
' 59
Gautreaux is interesting for several reasons. First, it illustrates how
a simple reframing of the legal argument can dramatically (and, again,
somewhat arbitrarily) alter a legal result. Just because the context of the
legal issue in Gautreaux changed to housing-and not education-the
scope of the violation was understood as having a wider boundary-an
entire housing market instead of a single school district. Even though the
inner-city residents of Chicago had virtually no chance of participating in
the suburban housing market, 160 they were viewed as part of that market.
Yet, these very same markets furnish the reason why the
socioeconomically disadvantaged cannot obtain housing in suburban
housing markets and are therefore fenced out of the school districts that
serve those markets. Second, Gautreaux's ruling led to a fairly extensive
housing voucher program that allowed many disadvantaged Chicago
residents to move to the suburbs and send their children to wealthier
suburban school districts: though many families did not avail themselves
of this option after the Gautreaux ruling, research suggests that those
who moved to the suburbs stayed there and succeeded in school.'6 '
Gautreaux requires policymakers and courts to reflect on the fact that
housing and education are inextricably intertwined.
157. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 286-87.
158. Id. at 299.
159. Id. at 296.
160. It is safe to assume that, in many cases, these residents were either priced out of
the suburban market-or zoned out.
161. See Frankenberg, supra note 138, at 67; Schwartz, supra note 156, at 32.
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As the above illustrates, school district boundaries matter, despite
their seemingly arbitrary nature. Any meaningful solution cannot ignore
this fact.
B. There Is a Need for a Democratic Equalization Principle In
Education.
Although the election law cases illustrated the debate as to whether
a democratic equalization principle should apply across the country,
162
the one-person one-vote standard emerged. This standard has been far
from perfect-but it is a standard-and it ensures that equal protection
claims are justiciable. Certainly, racial vote dilution challenges are much
more difficult to assess than claims challenging whether districts are
equally populated, but those legal claims are also bound by standards to
some degree. The complexities and challenges of assessing racial vote
dilution claims, as well as one-person one-vote claims, are beyond the
scope of this Article. The point, simply put, is to learn from election law
that there are relatively clear-and known-legal principles that guide
courts and policymakers with respect to electoral redistricting.
As of now, no principle other than "local control" guides courts and
policymakers with respect to school district boundaries, as Milliken
makes clear. So long as school desegregation lawsuits cannot
successfully demonstrate a school district's overt intent to discriminate,
local decisions that preserve existing school district boundaries may be
made with impunity. No democratic equalization principle applies that
would compel changes to the ways that school district boundaries are
drawn or maintained. As a result, no one considers the democratic
implications of such boundaries-for those who wish to maintain those
boundaries, ignorance is bliss. 63  Thus, it is important to adopt a
democratic equalization principle in the school district boundary context
that would promote awareness of the socioeconomic and demographic
effects of school district boundary decisions.
C. A Viable Policy Solution Must Preserve Local Control of
Schooling.
Although local control is given far greater significance in the case
law than is probably warranted, nothing is wrong with certain notions of
162. See supra Part II.
163. See WEIER, supra note 74, at x ("The drawing and redrawing of political
boundaries is a more subtle strategy than confrontation, but its effects are more pervasive
and enduring. Indeed, if political boundaries are appropriately drawn, confrontation is
not required to maintain racial separation.").
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local control-indeed, principles of local control in education are
beneficial insofar as they would, among other things, allow communities
to democratically promote innovation and experimentation in educational
methods. For example, local decisions could be made to tailor curricula
to meet the local needs of the community, and these decisions would
derive from a diverse set of school boards with vastly different
educational interests; rural schools may have different educational
priorities than urban schools.164  Such second-order diversity across
school districts is beneficial to our federalism,'65 and in this sense, local
control is valuable. Indeed, the only aspects of local control that are
problematic are those aspects that are used as a pretext to justify
entrenched boundary lines that promote the exclusion and subordination
of the socioeconomically disadvantaged.166 Thus, if such boundary lines
were redrawn to promote socioeconomic integration using a democratic
equalization principle, many problems with local control would dissipate
over time. 
167
Even though local control of schools has already been diminished to
some degree as a result of the increased federal involvement in
education,168 such as in NCLB and RTTT,1 69 policymakers cannot ignore
164. Milliken itself recognized these specific benefits of local control, explaining
that local control "permits the structuring of school programs to fit local needs, and
encourages 'experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational
excellence."' Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-742 (1974) (quoting San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973)).
165. See Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REv. 1099,
1128 (2008).
166. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 76, at 72 ("[L]ocal land use regulation and local
responsibility for funding basic public services would not be so problematic if local
governments were either relatively equal in taxable wealth or populated by similar mixes
of high, middle, and low-income residents.").
167. See id. (noting that neither school funding equalization nor efforts to
affirmatively promote housing diversity "would be necessary if local boundary lines were
drawn in order to combine more and less affluent areas into common political and fiscal
units" and that "[s]uch a standard for boundary-setting would eliminate fiscal inequality
and much of the incentive for exclusionary regulation").
168. As Michael Heise explains:
The Court's fidelity to local control . . . rests increasingly uneasy in today's
education setting. Stylized notions about local control over America's school
policy, however powerful, have not accurately described the allocation of
American education policy for decades. The influence of local school
authorities on school policy has waned due to legislative assertions by states
and the federal government. Thus, the Court displayed increased confidence in
local control over school policymaking (including fiscal policy) as state and
federal lawmakers encroached upon local autonomy. Since the 1970s the trend
toward greater centralization of education policymaking authority has, if
anything, accelerated and broadened.
Heise, supra note 100, at 66.
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the Court's historic solicitude for local control in the context of school
district boundaries. Therefore, any proposal that uses a democratic
equalization principle to redraw school district boundaries must also
thoughtfully articulate why and how it would maintain principles of local
control. The proposal adopted here would not only be consistent with
local control, but it would likely make local control of schools stronger
in the long run.
IV. APPLYING THE LESSONS LEARNED: A PROPOSAL FOR DEMOCRATIC
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
Having gathered the lessons learned from both election and
education law, this Article now explains the details of a hypothetical
proposal for promoting democratic school desegregation. As noted
above, it is impossible to create broad institutional changes unless we can
agree on a democratic equalization principle. In light of the analysis in
Part III, this principle likely will not come from the courts. The time has
come and gone for the federal courts to enter the political thicket in
education.170 The proposed solution in this Article comes with the
expectation that it will most likely be generated through legislation at the
federal or state level, as explained in more detail below. The thrust of
169. See Diane Ravitch, Just Say No to Race to the Top, EDUC. WK. (May 25, 2010,
7:56 AM), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/Bridging-
Differences/2010/05/just saynotothe race-to-the.html ("Race to the Top erodes local
control of education by prompting legislatures to supersede local school boards on any
issues selected by federal bureaucrats."); Greg Toppo, States Fight No Child Left Behind,
Calling It Intrusive, USA TODAY (Feb. 11, 2004, 8:54 PM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/education/2004-02-11-no-child-usat x.htm
(explaining that nine states took steps to opt out or block spending on No Child Left
Behind because it was "an intrusion on local control").
170. This is not to say that I would consider it outside of the realm of possibility for a
state court to adopt a democratic equalization principle. For example, in Sheff v. O'Neill,
678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996), the Connecticut Supreme Court determined that the racial
isolation of minority students in greater Hartford was unconstitutional under the
Connecticut state constitution due to the "town boundaries" that were entrenched by the
State's "school districting scheme." See id. at 1289. However, in that case, the court did
not propose the democratic equalization principle or any other remedy. The remedy that
has been implemented as a result of the parties' settlement primarily relies on magnet
schools, interdistrict transfer programs, and annual targets for racial integration (the
current goal in that regard is that 44% of Hartford students attend school in schools with
reduced racial isolation). See John Moran, Summary of New Sheff Agreement (Jan. 27,
2014), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2014/rpt/pdf/2014-R-0028.pdf. Given that other statewide
challenges to statewide school systems continue to be pursued, including another suit in
Connecticut, there is reason to believe that a democratic equalization principle could be
adopted in one of those suits in the not too distant future. See Litigations Challenging
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the proposal is driven by a democratic equalization principle that
espouses the goal that, in the long run, no child in the United States will
attend a high poverty school-rather, all students would attend schools
with a middle-class majority.
Movement toward such a goal will dramatically improve
educational outcomes in the United States.171 Derek Black articulates the
motivation for ensuring that more schools comprise a respectably-sized
middle-class:
Although high-poverty schools can undermine students' education,
predominantly middle-income schools bring affirmative benefits to
the learning environment. The crucial ingredient in the success of
middle-income schools is the students who attend them. Middle-
income students themselves are thus an educational resource. The
quality of a student's educational experience can be as dependent on
his peers as it is on his teachers, the quality of his school building, or
the substance of his curriculum. First, students depend heavily upon
one another for their learning. They study together, teach one
another, and compete against one another, raising the academic bar.
Due to the opportunities they receive outside of school, middle- and
high-income students tend to bring more educational capital to school
and, thus, elevate the learning of those around them. Second,
171. See, e.g., Richard D. Kahlenberg, Introduction: Socioeconomic School
Integration, in THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL INTEGRATION, supra note 18, at 1, 2. Kahlenberg
notes that
districts, under increasing pressure to raise the achievement of low-income and
minority students, are beginning to heed the evidence suggesting that one of the
most effective ways to do so is to give low-income and working-class students
a chance to attend predominantly middle-class schools. . . . [M]iddle-class
schools are twenty-two times as likely to be high performing as high-poverty
schools.
Id.; see also Brief of Amici Curiae The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law,
The Poverty & Race Research Action Council, The Opportunity Agenda, and The
Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights and The Leadership Conference
Education Fund, et al., In Support of Respondent The Exclusive Communities Project,
Inc. at 27-3 1, Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. The Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 46 (filed Dec. 23, 2014) (No. 13-1371); Jeanne L. Reid, Socioeconomic
Diversity and Early Learning: The Missing Link in Policy for High-Quality Preschools,
in THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL INTEGRATION, supra note 18, at 67, 69, 106-107 (explaining
that pre-kindergarten students in classrooms with above-average economic
socioeconomic compositions were positively impacted in their achievement in three
areas: receptive language, expressive language, and math learning); ROSLYN ARLIN
MICKELSON, NAT'L COAL. ON SCH. DIVERSITY, RESEARCH BRIEF No. 5, SCHOOL
INTEGRATION AND K-12 EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES: A QUICK SYNTHESIS OF SOCIAL
SCIENCE EVIDENCE (2011), available at http://wwwschool-
diversity.org/pdf/DiversityResearchBriefNo5.pdf; GENEVIEVE SIEGEL-HAWLEY & ERICA
FRANKENBERG, NAT'L COAL. ON SCH. DIVERSITY, RESEARCH BRIEF No. 6, MAGNET
SCHOOL STUDENT OUTCOMES: WHAT THE RESEARCH SAYS (2011), available at
http://www.school-diversity.org/pdf/DiversityResearchBriefNo6.pdf.
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middle-income students come from families that tend to have higher
academic expectations for their children. When these students are
the majority in a school, the students create a culture of high
achievement that benefits everyone. 1
72
Moreover, beyond the benefits that may accrue to the socioeconomically
disadvantaged as a result of attending schools with middle and upper
class peers, all children will benefit from attending schools with children
of different economic backgrounds, as they will better appreciate
differences and become better at adapting to a multi-cultural society.73
Given these benefits, it is worth establishing a democratic equalization
principle that focuses on socioeconomic school integration.
A. The 60/40 Principle: The Principle and Its Enforcement
The 60/40 principle is a democratic equalization principle that has
three components: (1) a threshold requirement that all school districts
comprise less than 60 percent low-income students; (2) an ongoing duty
to reduce the proportion of low-income students to below 40 percent in
all school districts (to facilitate the elimination of all high poverty
schools in each district); and (3) an escape provision that provides
additional autonomy once all school districts in a state eliminate high-
poverty schools. Because this principle only takes socioeconomic status
into account, it complies with Parents Involved.174  The principle,
moreover, maintains school districts as the political unit by which
students are distributed-ensuring that local control of school districts
remains possible-but, at the same time, recognizes that school district
boundaries may need to be periodically redrawn as a last resort.
However, the thrust of this democratic desegregation proposal is the
172. Derek W. Black, Middle-Income Peers as Educational Resources and the
Constitutional Right to EqualAccess, 53 B.C.L. REv. 373,409 (2012).
173. See, e.g., Nancy Conneely, Note, After PICS: Making the Case for
Socioeconomic Integration, 14 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 95, 115 (2008). Conneely explains:
Attending diverse schools serves the interests of all students by preparing them
for life in a multicultural world. Because children will grow into adults who
work in pluralistic society, it is in their best interest to learn as early as possible
how to interact with people whom they perceive to be different from
themselves. It is beneficial to get different viewpoints, and to be exposed to
and become comfortable with different cultures and ways of thinking.
Id. (citing Brief of 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 6,
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (Nos. 05-
908, 05-915), 2006 WL 2927079).
174. See supra Part III.C. It may be possible to achieve the principle using methods
that take race into account under Parents Involved, but there will be no race-based
benchmarks under the proposal.
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achievement of the goals consistent with the 60/40 principle itself-and
not the redrawing of district boundaries.
1. Threshold Requirement
The central component of democratic school desegregation is a
principle referred to as the 60/40 principle. This democratic equalization
principle aims to ensure that, in the long run, no child in the United
States will attend a "high-poverty" school. 75 This principle should be
the starting point for a national conversation about educational equity.
According to recent research, the proportion of low-income students in a
given state ranges from approximately 19 percent to 72 percent.
1 76
Further, 95 percent of the states have a statewide low-income percentage
below 60 percent. 177 Thus, under this proposal, the federal government
(or a state) would establish a principle whereby all school districts must
be configured such that, as a threshold matter, fewer than 60 percent of
the students in each school district are from low-income backgrounds.
The measurement of "low-income" would be an objective benchmark
that could not be manipulated by state governments.178 The reason for
such an objective measurement would be to prevent a race-to-the-bottom,
wherein districts redefine their definition of "low-income" so that they
could meet the 60 percent requirement, similar to how states lowered
their performance standards in response to NCLB. 179 The 60 percent
175. "High-poverty" school, for purposes of this proposal, is a school that is over
50% low-income.
176. See Mantil et al., supra note 18, at 215-16 app. 5.1.
177. See id.
178. The measurement of low-income, for example, could be tied to the federal
poverty line or to the qualifying standard for free and reduced-price lunch consistent with
the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Income Eligibility Guidelines. See School Meals:
Income Eligibility Guidelines, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIc. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV.,
http://www.ffs.usda.gov/school-meals/income-eligibility-guidelines (last visited Jan. 25,
2015).
179. See Richard D. Kahlenberg, Introduction to IMPROVING ON No CHILD LEFT
BEHIND 1, 8 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2008). Kahlenberg explains that:
NCLB not only fails to encourage states to set rich and consistent content
standards, it also allows them to set wildly different performance standards for
what constitutes 'proficiency.' According to a 2007 study by Northwest
Evaluation Associates and the Thomas B. Fordham Institute, passing scores
vary from the sixth to the seventy-seventh percentile. Worse, by requiring 100
percent proficiency [in 2014], NCLB actually provides a perverse incentive for
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would be a mandatory requirement180 and would be a realistic goal given
the distribution of poverty across the states.
2. Ongoing Duty
However, the 60/40 principle only starts with the 60 percent
requirement. Once all school districts in a state reach the point where
they have obtained a population that contains less than 60 percent low-
income students, the state would have the affirmative duty to continue
taking measures to further reduce the proportion of low-income students
in each school district. That is, over time, the state would need to take
steps toward the goal that all school districts in the state have less than 40
percent of its students identified as low-income. This is the goal because
research suggests hat such a cutoff would likely ensure that all students
within each school district could then be assigned such that they would
all attend schools that contain fewer than 50 percent low-income
students.1 81 Thus, the 40 percent portion of the 60/40 principle is meant
to ensure the ultimate goal: that no child in the United States (or, at
minimum, the state that implements the proposal) attend a high-poverty
school, which, for the purposes of this Article, is defined as a school
comprising more than 50 percent low-income students.
3. Escape Provision
Under the 60/40 principle, any state that meets the 40 percent
threshold and maintains a districting scheme wherein all of its students
are able to attend a school that has less than 50 percent low-income
students, as objectively defined, would not need to meet any further
requirements under the statute or program as long as that latter condition
is continuously met during each enforcement period. Regardless of the
design of the desegregation program that implements the principle, the
most critical goal is that no child should attend a high poverty school,
and creative solutions should be encouraged. Thus, such states would be
allowed to maintain their school district boundaries if they so choose.
This is because such states, given their substantial progress, should be
180. I understand that this requirement may be impossible for the five states with
over 60% low income to achieve, at least in the first few years of the program. For these
states, the initial threshold percentage would be set higher and operate on a sliding scale,
with the requirement eventually becoming 60%.
181. See Mantil et al., supra note 18, at 186 (stating that "[g]iven logistical and
political constraints, a district SES [socioeconomic status] ceiling of 40 percent low-
income may be needed to ensure a school SES ceiling of 50 percent low-income for all
schools in the district"). Depending on nationwide data and state-by-state trends, the
initial threshold may need to be set differently, and the 60% number advanced here is an
estimate that may require adjustment.
[Vol. 119:3
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given the autonomy to more freely experiment with their school
districting and education system to continue the progress that has been
made. Moreover, this policy ensures that policymakers, as well as state
or federal agencies, can focus enforcement of the 60/40 principle on
those states that need it most.
182
B. Adoption and Enforcement of the Principle
One of three mechanisms could codify the democratic school
desegregation principle into law. First, Congress may codify the
principle through the upcoming NCLB reauthorization. The principle
could then be tied to Title I funding or other federal grant programs,
which would provide an incentive for states to adopt the principle. Such
a solution would be most effective in covering nearly all states, with the
exception of the states that may decline federal funds for political or
other reasons.1 83 Second, states may adopt the principle in response to a
federal incentive grant program similar to the recent RTTT program.
1 84
If state legislatures adopted the principle through such a federal program,
they would receive federal dollars as long as the states enforced the
60/40 principle on an ongoing basis. Third, state legislatures could adopt
the 60/40 principle by their own accord and without federal incentives.
No matter the mechanism, it is critical that individual states enact laws in
support of the policy, as "endorsement from the state is an essential
element for success in efforts to mitigate the educational inequities
caused by district boundaries."'185
182. I certainly think that states can-and should-do better than this goal.
Nevertheless, I also believe that the key to a viable integration policy is that it be
politically tenable and realistic. There is evidence that, for example, conservatives have
begun to warm up to the idea of socioeconomic school integration. See Richard D.
Kahlenberg, Class No Longer Dismissed: Why Some Conservatives Are Warming to
Socioeconomic School Integration, WASH. MONTHLY (Jan./Feb. 2013),
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/j anuaryfebruary_2013/on-politicalboo
ks/class no longer dismissed042129.php?page=all. Additionally, although Milliken was
a case of racial desegregation, it was understood that "the true appeal of metropolitan
remedies lay more in the need for class than racial interaction." WILKINSON, supra note
72, at 220.
183. Various suits upheld the constitutionality of NCLB under the spending clause,
and I would expect this proposal to similarly survive scrutiny under that clause. See
Shannon K. McGovern, A New Model for States as Laboratories for Reform: How
Federalism Informs Education Policy, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1519, 1534 n.84 (2011).
184. Race to the Top successfully triggered numerous tatewide reforms with respect
to charter schools and other federal initiatives. Thirty-four of the forty-seven applicants
in Phases One and Two of Race to the Top changed state education law or policy in their
bid for extra funding, even though most of them ultimately did not receive any funding.
See id. at 1538; see also Kiel, supra note 24, at 150.
185.. See Kiel, supra note 24, at 139.
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The enforcement of the 60/40 principle will occur periodically in
states where the policy is adopted. For example, enforcement could
occur every ten years after each decennial census. After each ten-year
period, the states and school districts within each state would need to
reevaluate their existing policies to improve the socioeconomic status
and educational opportunities of citizens and consider whether changes
to those policies are needed-up to and including modifications of the
state's school district boundaries.186  A critical component to
enforcement will be that states, as part of the policy's design, would
assume an affirmative duty to meet the goals of the proposal during each
enforcement period. The state laws that implement the policy, in turn,
would impose an affirmative duty on local governments to make
reasonable efforts to progress toward the requirements. As a result,
states and local governments could be subject to suit (either at the state
or federal level, depending on the circumstance) if they have not made
reasonable efforts to progress toward the requirements of the law-
including situations where states have not redrawn their school district
boundaries when doing so would have been the most viable means for
demonstrating progress toward the principle's goals.
C. Methods of Compliance with the 60/40 Principle
To be clear, the 60/40 principle itself drives the proposal presented
in this Article. Thus, assuming that states or the federal government
adopted the 60/40 principle, the goals underlying the principle may be
achieved using many different means. That is, states can and should be
encouraged to do anything in their power to ensure that no children in
their state attend a high-poverty school. This can include statewide
efforts to reduce poverty generally (for example, by promoting policies
that create jobs and improve the economy) or housing policies that
ensure that more socioeconomically diverse populations attend schools in
adjacent school districts.8 ' It can also include education policies that
promote academic improvements that enable families to improve their
socioeconomic status over time. These sorts of solutions, by improving
the economic standing of citizens, will reduce the number of children
186. If such redrawing were not considered politically, the boundaries would likely
return to a state that promoted segregation. See Saiger, supra note 6, at 531 ("If
boundaries are enlarged or redrawn on a one-off basis, stratification can replicate itself.").
187. See supra Part III (describing the Gautreaux case and the benefits resulting
from vouchers facilitating moves from poorer to wealthier districts). Moreover, if a
wealthy suburban area alters its zoning regulations to allow greater numbers of the
disadvantaged to live in that district, that district will regress toward the median income.
If the district continues to maintain practices that exclude such individuals, it may
continue to do so, but it would need to open up the schools.
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who attend "high-poverty" schools and will correlate with improved
educational outcomes. However, states and school districts will likely
need other policy measures in the near-term to comply with the principle.
1. Intra-District Solutions
As noted above, the ultimate goal of the 60/40 principle, properly
functioning, is that no child attends a high-poverty school, where a
"high-poverty" school is defined as a school that contains greater than 50
percent low-income students. Thus, even assuming that all districts
comprise a population of less than 40 percent low-income students, it is
possible that segregation remains within school districts such that a
substantial number of students continue to attend high poverty schools.'88
As a result, under this Article's democratic school desegregation
proposal, measures need to be taken within each school district to ensure
that all students attend individual schools that are less than 50 percent
low-income. In districts where socioeconomic status is fairly uniformly
distributed, this will likely be relatively simple once the district as a
whole contains a population that is less than 40 percent low-income.
However, in school districts (for example, urban school districts) where
housing segregation separates the wealthier population from the poorer
population, it may be necessary to draw attendance zones within the
school district that facilitate socioeconomic integration (for example, the
pie-shaped wedges that were used in Swann'89) or to adopt student
assignment policies that take socioeconomic status into account. 190 Other
policies that states and school districts could implement include parental
controlled choice programs, student transfer programs that take
socioeconomic status into account, and preferential admissions to magnet
schools that promote socioeconomic diversity within those schools.'9'
2. Inter-District Solutions
Although intra-district solutions may move the needle to some
degree, states and local governments that seriously intend to comply with
188. See, e.g., Kiel, supra note 24, at 146 ("School attendance zones, the boundaries
that fix which school a student will attend, can cause similar problems to district lines.
After all, a disparity often exists in educational experience within school districts that
looks just like the ... disparities across districts.").
189. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1971); see
also Sheneka Williams & Erica Frankenberg, Using Geography to Further Racial
Integration, in INTEGRATING SCHOOLS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, supra note 138, at 223,
224; supra text accompanying note 78.
190. See Williams & Frankenberg, supra note 189, at 224 (describing the Wake
County Public School System).
191. See Mantil et al., supra note 18, at 184-85.
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the 60/40 principle must at least be open to the possibility of using inter-
district remedies to solve the problems. Given the current composition
of school districts in the United States, only about 500,000 out of a
possible 15,000,000 students in high-poverty schools could be reassigned
to low-poverty schools as a result of intra-district strategies.192 A recent
study, however, suggests that inter-district strategies could reduce the
number of high poverty schools by more than a third.1 93 Some examples
of inter-district solutions include regional magnet schools (such as those
created in greater Hartford to comply with the Sheff v. O'Neill
settlement194) and inter-district transfer programs.195  Such programs
could provide transportation to facilitate students' movement between
and within school districts.
3. A Last Resort: Redrawing District Boundaries
If states are unable to comply with the 60/40 principle using any of
the methods described above, a last resort under the proposal would be to
redraw school district boundaries using a state level authority. Although
such redrawing may be necessary in the early stages of democratic
school desegregation, such redrawing would become less necessary as
time progresses and the goals of the 60/40 principle are met. However,
states would always have the duty to reconsider school district lines, if
necessary, to comply with the principle. This could entail consolidating
suburban and urban school districts into larger districts, making
relatively minor boundary changes around property-poor urban or rural
areas, or subdividing cities into smaller school districts.196 With regard
to the latter proposal, breaking up an urban district into smaller districts
may, to some extent, reduce the stigma associated with the large urban
school district.
To implement school district boundary redrawing, this Article
proposes that each state, as part of the legislation, create a neutral state-
level committee to propose a series of potential redistricting solutions
192. Id. at 156, 188.
193. Id. at 207.
194. Sheffv. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1270-71 (Conn. 1996) held that de facto racial
segregation in Hartford, Connecticut violated provisions of the Connecticut State
Constitution. Accordingly, the state undertook measures, such as inter-district magnet
schools, to desegregate the schools in greater Hartford under the terms of a negotiated
settlement, which is still in effect today.
195. Mantil et al., supra note 18, at 189-93.
196. For example, Fischel explains that "[iut may be better for cities themselves to
have smaller school districts"--indeed, nothing legally compels urban centers to have
such large districts. FISCHEL, supra note 128, at 209.
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with a recommendation during each enforcement period.19 7  School
districts, during this process, would be able to submit redistricting
proposals to the committee for consideration. Those proposals the
committee approves would then need further approval by the towns
affected by the redrawing for a vote, thereby preserving local control.
198
The committee should design an initial redistricting proposal to
achieve the 60 percent threshold goal only, so as to minimize disruption
of existing school district boundaries.'99 After the state achieves the 60
percent goal, states and school districts would need to submit revised
plans in successive enforcement periods that would generate further
progress toward the 40 percent goal (unless, of course, reasonable
progress can be made in the districts using the other intra-district policy
measures described above). Because school redistricting is a last resort
under the 60/40 proposal, the goal during every decennial period should
be to give the state and local governments within the state a chance to
make progress toward the benchmarks of the 60/40 principle without
using redistricting. Because the threat of any redistricting always looms
in the background, however, this Article contends that this policy would
motivate state actors to remedy fundamental issues pertaining to poverty
and housing segregation that foster much of the segregation and
inequality in the United States. The ultimate goal of the policy, of
course, is to reach a steady state wherein there is never a need to redraw
school district boundaries.
There is a risk that, even if a statewide committee provides school
redistricting recommendations to the state legislature, existing local
school districts may choose to reject any redistricting proposal.
However, because the state laws that would implement the policy would
impose an affirmative duty on local governments to make progress
toward the 60/40 principle's goals, such local governments would be
subject to suit if they did not have a bona fide justification for rejecting
the proposal. Thus, a locality that chooses to reject a redistricting
197. See also Saiger, supra note 6, at 533 ("[B]orders would be actively drawn by a
larger, nonlocal polity, almost certainly the state, in accordance with state rules designed
to assure interdistrict equity.").
198. There is precedent for review boards that assess the propriety of proposed
boundary changes but many of them require local consent. See Briffault, supra note 76,
at 82-85. For example, if two suburban districts are consolidated into an urban district,
the consent of the two suburban districts and the urban district would be needed to
approve the proposal from the committee.
199. A proposal that does not make immediate, dramatic redistricting changes would
be more politically tenable than one that would immediately merge entire suburban and
urban districts together, for example. See, e.g., Kiel, supra note 24, at 157-64
(describing state legislative efforts to merge Memphis with suburban districts in Shelby
County, Tennessee, and subsequent efforts by the suburban districts to create their own
districts in view to circumvent the state law).
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proposal without basis runs the risk that it will face a school redistricting
map imposed by a state court. This Article hypothesizes that local
governments would not want to run such a risk, as this may result in a
redistricting map that the local government dislikes more than the one
that they had a hand in proposing to the statewide committee. Moreover,
such localities would likely lose the suit because the evidence that the
district had not contributed to progress toward the 60/40 principle would
be clear.
In response to this, critics may argue that states that implement this
policy would impinge on the autonomy of local school districts.
However, from a purely legal standpoint, local autonomy does not pose a
problem. School districts are creatures of the state and are rarely granted
"home rule" autonomy from the state.20 Moreover, the Supreme Court
recognizes that local government units, such as municipalities, exercise
their powers "in the absolute discretion of the [s]tate" and "[t]he
[s]tate... at its pleasure may modify or withdraw all such powers...
expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with
another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation....
with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their
protest.,20 1  Thus, while localities may express some political
200. See Saiger, supra note 6, at 509 ("The blackest of black-letter doctrine insists
that school districts, like other local governments, are but 'creatures of the state."');
Richard Briffault, The Role of Local Control in School Finance Reform, 24 CONN. L.
REv. 773, 779-80 (1992). Briffault states:
Education is considered a subject. of plenary state power .... Home rule and
attendant concepts of local autonomy ... are usually reserved for municipal
corporations and other general purpose local governments. Home rule is rarely,
if ever, extended to special districts, such as school districts. Thus . . . local
school districts are likely to be considered arms of the state, and state power to
create, alter, reorganize or destroy school districts is not affected by home rule.
Indeed, in some states, the nexus between a local school board and the state is
so tight that the local board lacks standing to sue the state.
Id.; cf S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 177 (1975)
("[I]t is fundamental and not to be forgotten that the zoning power is a police power of
the state and the local authority is acting only as a delegate of that power and is restricted
in the same manner as is the state.").
201. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907), overruled on other
grounds by Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. 2, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); see Holt Civic Club
v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71 (1978) (noting that, despite being overruled on
other grounds, Hunter "continues to have substantial constitutional significance in
emphasizing the extraordinarily wide latitude that states have in creating various types of
political subdivisions and conferring authority upon them"); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 575 (1964) ("Political subdivisions of States--counties, cities, or whatever-never
were and never have been considered as sovereign entities. Rather, they have been
traditionally regarded as subordinate governmental instrumentalities created by the State
to assist in the carrying out of state governmental functions."); see also Lee v. City of
Harlingen, Tex., No. 1-10-233, 2011 WL 6371089, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2011)
(citing Holt Civic Club and noting that Hunter remains good law for this proposition).
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disagreements with the 60/40 principle as adopted by the states, they will
not likely be able to take legal action against the states that implement
the policy.
D. The Relevance of NCLB to the Proposal
This proposal is not meant to be a complete replacement of NCLB
in its current form. Though the current academic growth goals of NCLB
(known as adequate yearly progress ("AYP") goals) are unrealistic,2 °2
accountability and standards, including academic target growth goals, are
worthwhile pursuits to the extent the goals that are set are reasonably
attainable. A full-throated analysis of the advantages and disadvantages
of NCLB is beyond the scope of this Article, but insofar as the
democratic school desegregation proposal advanced here leads to
alterations in either the population or boundaries of school districts, such
shifts in population must be taken into account for purposes of NCLB's
academic accountability goals. It may, for example, be necessary to
provide safe harbors for school districts that accept a significant number
203 sfof lower income students in their districts. These safe harbors could,
for example, exclude from NCLB growth targets low-income students
who move or are redistricted into a higher income district for a period of
years. Alternatively, NCLB could reframe the standard to focus on the
value added (or academic growth) achieved by individual students, rather
But see Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1960) (explaining that the state's
power to alter municipal boundaries must "lie[] within the scope of relevant limitations
imposed by the United States Constitution[,]" where a state legislature had
unconstitutionally altered municipal boundaries to discriminate against blacks in
violation of the Fifteenth Amendment by denying them from exercising the franchise in
Tuskegee, Alabama).
202. For example, the AYP target for 2014-last year-was 100% proficiency. See
Amit R. Paley, 'No Child' Target Is Called Out of Reach, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/03/13/AR2007031301781.html ("No Child Left Behind, the
landmark federal education law, sets a lofty standard: that all students tested in reading
and math will reach grade level by 2014. Even when the law was enacted five years ago,
almost no one believed that standard was realistic.").
203. See Jennifer Jellison Holme & Amy Stuart Wells, School Choice Beyond
District Borders: Lessons for the Reauthorization of NCLB from Interdistrict
Desegregation and Open Enrollment Plans, in IMPROVING ON No CHILD LEFT BEHIND,
supra note 179, at 139,202-03. The article states:
Without a temporary "safe haven" provision, suburban districts would be less
likely to accept urban transfer students, particularly those who are low
achieving. While the progress of these new transfer students should be
monitored and districts should be held accountable for adding value and
helping them achieve to a high standard, initially their state test scores should
not be used to keep suburban districts from making AYP.
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than on the absolute percentage of students who are deemed proficient on
an assessment.
Additionally, this democratic school desegregation proposal is
meant to complement NCLB. In NCLB's original implementation, it
included a program to facilitate transfers of students from lower
performing to higher performing schools.204 However, only around one
percent of students were able to take advantage of the program,20 5 and it
did not provide receiving schools with any incentives to accept transfer
students: "[o]ne of the reasons is that while the federal Education
Department has adopted language encouraging school districts to form
inter-district transfer agreements, there are no financial or legal
incentives to do so. '' 206 The democratic school desegregation proposal
would thus complement the intended goal of NCLB's transfer policy.
E. Financial Considerations
Finally, in implementing the democratic school desegregation
proposal advanced here, it will also be important to consider certain
financial components. First, to the extent that states implement transfer
programs that allow lower-income students to move to schools in
wealthier school districts, those districts should be compensated for the
transfer commensurate with their per-pupil spending if possible. Such
funding would likely make the wealthier districts more amenable to the
proposal.20 7 Second, policymakers should provide state and federal
funds to transport students under the program.20 8
V. POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES AND CHALLENGES OF DEMOCRATIC
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
Democratic school desegregation, along with implementation of the
60/40 principle, will produce many advantages but would also face
several challenges. This Part aims to anticipate some of the arguments
for and against the proposal at a high level, with the understanding that
the primary goal of this Article is to foster a fresh conversation about
school diversity some sixty years after Brown. These lists are not meant
to be exhaustive.
204. See Meredith P. Richards, Kori J. Stroub & Jennifer Jellison Holme, Can NCLB
Choice Work? Modeling the Effects of Interdistrict Choice on Student Access to Higher-
Performing Schools, in THE FUTuRE OF SCHOOL INTEGRATION, supra note 18, at 223,
224-25.
205. See id. at 224.
206. DeBray-Pelot & Frankenberg, supra note 24, at 271.





Numerous advantages could accrue from democratic school
desegregation, assuming that the 60/40 principle (or another similar
principle) is implemented at the state or national level. First, as
discussed above, a democratic school desegregation principle will hold
local school districts accountable for helping to reduce socioeconomic
disparities across and within school districts. This accountability will not
only improve individual school districts' focus on socioeconomic
isolation in schools, but may also promote regional cooperation among
and between neighboring groups of school districts.2 °9  The
accountability will derive from codifying a principle like the 60/40
principle as a legal requirement that states and school districts must aim
to reach on a consistent basis.
Second, by aspiring to ensure that all schools are less than 50
percent low-income, a greater proportion of low-income students will
attend schools with higher-income peers. As the research widely
shows,210 such low-income students will benefit not only from the
presence of the higher income students in the classroom, they will also
benefit from the political clout that results from having more affluent
parents in the school. In particular, research shows that the political
preferences of the more economically advantaged disproportionately
influence policy outcomes relative to those of the less advantaged.211
Third, the democratic school desegregation principle presented here
would not undermine traditional notions of local control. So long as
school districts and regional school district coalitions undertake efforts to
achieve the goals associated with the 60/40 principle, they will be able to
implement a wide-range of solutions consistent with local values and
ideals. As discussed above, school districts may undertake customized
solutions to problems of socioeconomic isolation and achieve
advancement oward democratic school desegregation in many different
ways.
Fourth, while promoting local innovation, implementation of the
60/40 principle will also promote larger investments in regional
209. In a recent piece, for example, Erika Wilson emphasized the value of
incentivizing regional cooperation or governance structures in implementing solutions to
the desegregation problem. See Wilson, supra note 24, at 1478, 1479 (arguing that
"regionalism in which the state requires or heavily incentivizes cooperation between local
school districts, is necessary" and that regional school district governing bodies "would
supplement local school districts by having policymaking authority to address regional
equity issues such as regional diversity in schools and the sharing of resources").
210. See supra note 171.
211. See generally MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC
INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA (2014).
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communities-those that are comprised of several school districts-
rather than only in smaller community units comprising a single school
district. A redistricting possibility, while unlikely, could motivate
parents to ensure that school districts in their greater community are
high-performing--otherwise, they run the risk that their child could
eventually be zoned into a less desirable school. Similarly, when
redistricting is possible, the likelihood of high-income flight from
districts will also decline because movement across boundaries would
not necessarily guarantee placement in a preferred school district.
212
Fifth, if school district boundaries were to change periodically,
democratic school desegregation policies will generate the expectation
that altering school district boundaries is a natural part of the democratic
process, much like electoral districting. Once this cultural shift occurs,
changes in district boundaries will be more tenable. Meanwhile, this
view of boundaries will produce a robust, quantitative literature that will
more proactively analyze the various permutations of school redistricting
schemes. This analysis can incorporate antitrust principles to ensure that
redistricting is done in a pro-competitive, democracy-enhancing
manner.
213
Sixth, the 60/40 principle is clear and will allow for easy
implementation because it is based on sheer percentages of low-income
students and the attainment of schools that do not have a majority of
students in poverty. It will thus be guided by a judicially manageable
standard,21 4 much like the one-person one-vote standard. Questions may
arise regarding the appropriate measure of low-income status (for
example, a proxy for poverty other than free and reduced lunch may be
212. See Saiger, supra note 6, at 531-32. When school redistricting is a possibility,
Saiger explains that:
Periodic redistricting means that a family contemplating fleeing to a different,
richer (or whiter) district would have to contemplate simultaneously that the
boundaries of their old district, or one like it, might soon come flying after
them. This reduces the expected value of flight, especially because the present
value of future exclusivity is capitalized in home prices.
Id.
213. See, e.g., WEIHER, supra note 74, at 174 (noting that "the possibility of
manipulating [school district] boundaries. . . presents the further potential for purposive
manipulation of markets," which can be done "with the specific intention of including
congenial groups and excluding others"); see also supra note 22 (highlighting the
literature of political antitrust).
214. See Saiger, supra note 6, at 539-40 (explaining that school redistricting does not
force courts to consider questions of educational policy and that courts are used to
handling redistricting in the election law context).
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needed 215), but that question can be resolved when lawmakers deliberate
over the policy.
B. Potential Challenges
There will likely be some challenges to democratic school
desegregation and the 60/40 principle that would need to be addressed by
policymakers. It is important to understand and consider these potential
challenges as any democratic school desegregation policies are
implemented.
First, many middle-class and affluent parents may resist democratic
school desegregation, and some localities may thus be better able and
prepared to implement the principle than others. For example, parents
may resist efforts to create more socioeconomic diversity in schools on
the grounds that wealthier students could suffer academic losses if they
are integrated with lower-class students. However, research suggests
that, for example, middle-income students are largely unaffected
academically by the presence of larger proportions of low-income
students in the classroom, especially where the proportion of low-income
students is less than 50 percent.216 At the outset, therefore, democratic
school desegregation efforts may need to be incremental, rather than
sweeping.
215. Recent analysis suggests that free and reduced-price lunch numbers have become
less effective indicators of low-income status and that it may be difficult to implement
democratic school desegregation using this measure. In particular, a recent report
determined that 21 states have more than 50% low-income students and that a majority of
students throughout the nation are low-income. See generally S. EDUC. FOUND., A NEW
MAJORITY: Low INCOME STUDENTS NOW A MAJORITY IN THE NATION'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS
(2015), available at http://www.southemeducation.org/getattachment/4ac62e27-5260-
47a5-9d02-14896ec3a53 1/A-New-Majority-2015-Update-Low-Income-Students-
Now.aspx. A better proxy measure to objectively identify "low-income" status may be
needed.
216. See Halley Potter, Boosting Achievement by Pursuing Diversity, Faces of
Poverty, EDUC. LEADERSHIP, May 2013, at 38, 40.
[A]ll students receive the cognitive benefits of a diverse learning environment;
and middle-class students' performance seems to be unaffected up to a certain
level of integration. Research about this last point is still developing. A recent
meta-analysis found "growing but still inconclusive evidence" that the
achievement of more advantaged students was not harmed by desegregation
policies. It appears that there is a tipping point, a threshold for the proportion
of low-income students in a school below which middle-class achievement
does not suffer.
Estimates of this tipping point vary; many researchers cite 50 percent low-
income as the maximum.
Id. (citations omitted), available at http://www.ascd.org/publications/educational-
leadership/mayl3/vol70/num08/Boosting-Achievement-by-Pursuing-Diversity.aspx.
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Second, even if the states or federal government successfully
enacted the 60/40 principle into law, states and localities may face
geographic and demographic constraints in reaching the targets
associated with the 60/40 principle, particularly in rural areas.21 7 In such
areas, it may be less practical to adjust school district boundaries to
achieve the goals of democratic school desegregation.
Third, cost may be an issue. Sufficient financial incentives need to
be provided to school districts to implement the 60/40 principle. For
example, there has been extensive debate and discussion over the
original NCLB law and whether it constituted an "unfunded mandate.21 8
Democratic school desegregation, if implemented, cannot be perceived
as an unfunded mandate. It must be backed by meaningful funding that
provides the incentives to implement the law so that it promotes
socioeconomic integration. Incentive programs like RTTT could be the
vehicle to provide such funding, as discussed above.
Even though democratic school desegregation may face these and
other challenges, the policy will foster a meaningful conversation about
the socioeconomic realities of our public schools as we attempt to reform
them in parallel using myriad other means, including teacher
accountability measures, charter school proposals, and early childhood
initiatives. Meanwhile, the advantages to democratic school
desegregation would likely accrue, and at the same time, policymakers
and voters could re-center conversations on the fact that education is
important as a democratic good: a fact that has simply been lost in
current discussions of education.
CONCLUSION
A review of election and education law illustrates their joint
relevance to democracy. Nonetheless, the doctrinal paths of election law
and educational law have been on opposite tracks. Federal election law
has converged toward judge-made rules and principles that seek to
redraw boundaries to ensure that all voters may cast "equally weighted
votes" that are not diluted on account of one's race, while federal
education law eschews any such rules, entrenches boundaries, and
generally defers to the districting decisions of local school authorities.
The education community can learn from these divergent doctrinal paths
217. See, e.g., Mantil et al., supra note 18, at 213 ("[I]n many areas, geography and
demographic constraints would preclude even the most willing communities from
undertaking SES-based student reassignments.").
218. See, e.g., No Child Left Behind is FUNDED, HOUSE EDUC. & WORKFORCE
COMM. (Jan. 2005),
http://archives.republicans.edlabor.house.gov/archive/issues/109th/education/nclb/nclbifu
nded.htm (arguing that NCLB was not an unfunded mandate).
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that, in order to achieve the democratic ends that have been thus far
realized in the election law context (and to get education law back on
track), education reformers must be guided by a democratic equalization
principle that removes the entrenchment of school district boundaries.
This is especially true in education, where an infinite number of
philosophies and perspectives could drive decision-making.
Additionally, policymakers must be mindful of the long history of
local control of schooling in the United States. Socioeconomic school
integration has been proposed here as an equalizing force in education,
and, for that reason, this Article has outlined a democratic equalization
principle that would focus on ensuring that no child in this nation attends
a high-poverty school. This principle will facilitate movement toward an
environment wherein state and local governments view district
boundaries as more malleable than they are today, facilitating future
discussions regarding equity and access to education that cross district
lines. By providing a democratic principle that focuses on
socioeconomic inequality, policymakers at the federal and state level will
be able to think outside the box to address both poverty and
socioeconomic integration of schools simultaneously. This Article does
not claim to make the "right" proposal and recognizes that, over time,
lawmakers will need to refine and develop policies that promote
democratic school desegregation. However, this Article is meant to
serve as a starting point that will prompt the conversations necessary to
get serious about reincorporating integration as a reform option during
the next reauthorization of NCLB and beyond.
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